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Abstract 
In the fall of 1873, an American merchant ship, the 
!irginius, was captured off the coast of Jamaica by aves-
., 
sel of the Cuban navy. The Virginius was believed to be 
operating on behalf of an insurrection against Spanish au-
thority in Cuba. Subsequently, a number of the passengers 
and crew were executed for allegedly illegal activities. 
The United States immediately presented a series of 
. demands, through its ambassador in Madrid, to the Spanish 
government. However, it soon became apparent that there 
could be no clear assignment of blame for the incident. As 
far as the American authorities were concerned, the Virginiu~ 
' 
was a properly registered vessel. Th.e ship's certification 
had been obtained under false pretenses and there were 
ce,rtain irregularities in the form of her registry. l~one-
theless, the certification had been granted and was, there-
fore, satisfactory proof of the nationality of the vessel 
as required by law. It was not, in any case, the right of 
a Cuban provincial governor or any Spanish official to 
determine the validity of that registry or the means by which 
it was obtained. 
On the other hand, there was a moral consideration 
which could not be ignored. The llrgini,us had been involved 
in operations against the legitimate government of Cuba. 
It had aided the dictator of a foreign nation against an 
insurrection in his own country and, thereby, aided indirect-
ly the cause of the rebellion in Cuba. Aboard the ship 
1. 
was the most obv:.ious ju~:ti fication for the Spanish actions; 
the presence of several prominent leaders of the revolution. 
Ultimately, a· compromise was reached, principally 
through the efforts ~f the American Secretary of-State. 
; The Virginius and the remaining crew were returned to the 
lJnited States, along· with an indemnity payment. On tl1e 
other hand, one of t.he demands, a salut_e to. the American 
flag, wae dispense.d with, the party directly responsible 
for tl1e executions esca.,p-e-d punisl1me11t, and Spain avoided war. 
:Ii. S.pan.isJ1 claim for an indemnity was denied, but the furtr1er 
.. a.ctivi·ty.:· ·of tl1e Vi,rginius was· prevented. In view of the: 
{J.i.rcu_m.-etance:~ of the affair .an·d o.f the legal argumentf3 wh·ic·h-
.deve:l,qped f-ro,m it., the .s·e.ttl:eml~nt· w·a:s an .equitable one • 
. -.... 
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Introduction 
In short, this study attempts to examine a crucial 
incident in America's diplomatic history and to determine 
both the solution that was reached and the means by which 
war was avoided. This, of necessity, must include an under-
standing of the conditions present in each of the nations 
directly involved, an analysis of the diplomatic proceed-
ings which effected the compromise, and certainly a review 
of the events and the personalities involved. By this 
means it is hoped to reveal more accurately the nature of 
Spanish-American relations in the period, with the expecta-
tion that· it might aid in understanding the present state 
of international affairs. 
In attemptir1g to, determine the conditions which acted 
to prevent a more serious situation from developing, it is 
impossible to limit the answer to one or another of the 
numerous influences which were present. 
No doubt,. there must be a most careful consideration 
of the events themselves, as the charges made by both sides 
reflected differing interpretations of those activities. 
The intellectual justification construed to support the 
allegations of both the United States and Spain was built 
upon available evidence, and to offer a proper presentation 
of the details of the seizure is fundamental to any discus-
sion. Following this, there must be a careful examination 
3 
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" 
of the law as it applie~, at that time, to the circumstances 
This must include not only the letter, of 
the law, but the spirit as well. In a more general sense, 
attention must be paid to the political and social reper-
cussions that would have been wrought in America, a nation 
weary from a violent civil upheaval ending less than a decade 
prior, and presently suffering from the effects of depression. 
Furtherrnore ,- the variable 11ature of her politics placed Spain 
in a position worse than that of America. Had she sought to 
pt.1ysically defend r1er posi tior1, it is likely tl1f1t the same 
political instability 11rl1icl1 allov1ed the acts lJrecipi tating 
the crisis to be committed in Santiago de Cuba, would have 
effectively prevented Spain from successTully conducting 
" a foreign 1var. Lastly, as it is men 1vho created the diplo-
matic l1istory of the period., it is th.ey wl10 must be scrutin-
ized, not only_for their conduct but for their ideas, which 
shaped those efforts. 
In sharp contrast to the solution which was reached 
at tr1is tirne to avert a ID()re serious confrontation \vas tl1e 
conflict between Spain and the United States later in the 
century. In light of this development, it is especially 
significant to examine the diplomacy of the Virgipius affair. 
The circumstances 1il1icl1 1,1ere pres.ent in each insta1:1ce 
were undoubtedly dissimilar in a number of ways, but if one 
examines, in cletail, the manner ir1 wl1ich a peaceful solution 
was reached in the first crisis, it is likely that a mor~ 
acqurate evaluation can be made of- the necessity for war in 
1898. The differences : , notwithstanding, there is much to 
4 
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b:·e, compared between both sets of events. Furthermore, 
there is often as much to be gained from an examination 
of the dissimilarity of circumstances as there is from 
their likeness. 
It also should be noted that what might appear to 
be an excess of detail in this history is included of neces-
sity. It is significant to include in any discussion of a 
limited set of events an analysis of the particulars which 
brought those events to a conclusion. There is no intention 
to negate the value of interpretation, but it was then as 
' difficult as it would be at present to solve any problem 
solely upon a hypothetical basis. Had Fish, Sickles, Cas-
telar and their contemporaries been less aware of the forces 
shaping their own decisions they would have been the less 
wiser, but had they failed to arrange the details of a pro-
tocol or, in reality, failed to conform to those particulars, 
the Virgini~~ controversy might well have found an entirely 
different significance in the course of history. 
5 
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Chapter I 
Incident at Santiago 
In the period of the first republic, from 1868 to 
1873, Spanish control of the colony of Cuba narrowed re-
markably. As the result of an increasingly unstable 
political situation at home, Spain's ability to exercise 
direct rule of internal Cuban affairs was significantly 
reduced. When in October of 1873, the government of Cuba, 
prompted by the reactionary forces which supported it, 
seized an American merchant vessel on the high seas, al~ 
legedly engaged in supplying the rebel forces on the island, 
there was li.ttle that Spain could do immediately to con-
trol the situation. Ultimately, however, she was forced 
to accept the responsibility for this action and the di-
sastrous consequences which followed. 
In 1843, Isabella II became Queen of Spain. The 
principal means of support for her reign came from the mil-
itary by way of its generals. After twenty years of abso-
lutist rule, under the guise of constitutiona.lism, she was 
overthrown. The legislature, the Cortes, however, voted to 
o.ontinue the monarchy and, after searching for nearly two 
years for a successor, settled upon Amadeo of Savoy, the 
Duke of Aosta in Italy. Besides the unfortunate distinc-
tion of being a foreigner, Amadeo had little basis for his 
reign. On the day that he reached Spain, the last of the 
military powers in the country, General Juan Prim, died of 
6 
wounds suffere.d in battle. The result was that the only 
force which had offered its support to the monarchy in the 
past was unable, in the confusion of the death of its leader, 
-to provide a source of power for the new king. 
There remained three forces in the country which vied· 
for power. The Alfonsists sought to regain the throne for 
Alfonso, the son of Isabella. They had little following 
because of the infamous history of the Bourbon family. The 
Carlists, on the other hand, had been in rebellion against 
the government from before the time of Isabella. They 
sought the throne for the heir to the pretender, Don Carlos, 
on the theory that the monarchy had not been absolutist to 
·the necessary extent. This faction was the greatest in 
strength and acquired support from ·tne -olergy. Last \vere 
the Republicans, who favored a more decentralized form of, 
-government •. It was they who would have ~heir moment of glory. 
Under Amadeo, the ministry was reconstituted on six 
' 
' occasions and three general elections were held, all within 
two years. In February of 1873, the king resigned. Before 
the end of the year, there was a succession of four Repub-
lican administrations. President Figueras resigned before 
the Cortes met and was followed by Pi y Margall who thought, 
as did his predeces-sor, that Spain's difficulties would work 
themselves out once that freedom, in the form of Republican-
ism, had been achieved. Pi believed in a federal republic 
but refused to impose it through the use of the executive 
authority. This position placed him in the center of the 
party; one extreme demanding a centralized, unitary republic 
and the other a federal system imposed immediately by the 
7 
masses. Pi chose to wait, with the firm belief that fed-
eralism would naturally evolve. His expectations were not 
realized and he was forced from office. Salmeron, a unitary 
Republican, tried the use of military power to defeat the 
"forces of disintegration" which plagued the country, par-
ticularly the Cantonalist revolts, but because of a fear 
of concentrating too much power in his own hands, he hesi-
tated and failed to establish a viable political system. 
Shortly thereafter, Emilio Castelar took Salmeron's place 
and the military was strengthened. This move killed Repub-
licanism. The Carlists and ma11y Republicans, who had sup-
ported the government with reservations, decided that the 
ascension of Alphonso was the only answer to Spain's insta-
bility. Alphonso returned to Spain in 1874 and thus ended 
the first republic.l 
It had become necessary for the Republicans to retain 
the support of the nation's powerful vested interests in 
order to remain in power in Spain. Am important prerequisite 
lJoseph Brandt, Toward the New Spain {Chicago, 1933). 
Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), 
pp. 290-342. 
Charles E. Chapman, A History of SEain {New York, 
1918), pp. 488-507. 
Lawrence Farnsworth, Spain's Strug8le for Freedom 
(Boston, 1957), pp. 113~124. 
C .A oM. Hennessey, The Federal Re;eublic in Spain,;_ 
Pi y Mar&all and the Federal Republican Movement,.1,868-74 
(Oxford, 1962). 
8 
for this· backing was that the government guarantee that 
Cuba remain within the realm, in order that the island's 
~resources miiht be effectively exploited to the benefit of 
those. interests. 
In 1868 an in·su:rrectio:h known as The Ten Years War ., :.· .. ·. . .. .. . ," 
began in Cuba. The o .. n.1.y means by which the Spanish gov-
ernment, occupied at ho.me, could hope successfully to resist 
<' 
was to offer thei~ support to the Volunteers, a group on the 
island co.mpos·e·d of m:iddle and upper class peninsulares. The 
result was t.hat t·:hi:s: group, the strongest faction on the 
island, was able to. :in.fluence the policy· O'·f the Captain-
Ge.,neral in pursui,ng the war against: t·he i.nsurgents, often 
C·ontrary to th.e. po.si·~.iQtJ d:ee.m.ed. advi~abl.e by the home gov-
e.rnment. 
Each admin.is .. trat·iori. wtis t:o··o ·.cc,:-nce·rned: wit:h i.ts· efforts .4. ... -. ' .•... •; . . . ..- .•. : . -.-. . -. 
to. remain in. power in Spa.i.11 to :ex.er.c.ise d.irect au tl1ori ty in 
the C·arribbean. As long as ra.w :n1ate.rial$ flowe..cl :from the 
i:·Erland· to Spain in a .sati·sf:actory mercantile :fashion, few 
·effo·rts were made· to tighten peninsula:r control of colonia·1. 
a:·t'.'fairs and t.he Vol·unteers gained a significant de,g;re.e ,of 
Il(lliti·cal aut.onomy. 
;T;hi·S s.·it·uation created consternation in diplomatic 
circles~,p.a.rticularly ,in1-·vi~w of the insurrection. fhe Vol-
unteers were permitted to exercise independent authority 
while remaining officially under the rule of Spain. Thus 
they were able to defy the policies of the government that 
was ultimately responsible for the conduct of the war.2 
2 . Carr, 308-309. 
9 
In Cuba, the plantation system was flourishing, al-
though it ,was depende~t upon A'frican slavery. In 1861 over 
a quarter of the population were slaves. A third of them 
were located on the vast sugar plantations and the remain-
der in the towns or engaged in the production of coffee and 
tobacco, or cattle raising. In the first half of the nine-
teenth century conditions for the Negro slave in Cuba were 
worse than in America. They were often forced to labor 
long hours in the fields and deprived of adequate food and 
rest. At the peak o-f t\he harvest season, probably ten per-
cent of the slave population perished.3 
Coincidental with the contemporary mood in other na-
tions towards humanitarian principles, a movement to abol-
ish slavery in Cuba began to grow. Though the powerful 
commercial interests on the island could not be expected 
easily to abandon an institution which had proved so highly 
productive in the past, the Spanish government felt pressure 
from France and Great Britain, who had instituted measures 
of their own to limit the African trade. Laws had been 
previously enacted by Spain to control the slave tr~de but 
they had never applied to Cuba. For fear that they could 
expect stricter measures in the future, many wealthy planters 
Philip Foner, History of Cuba and its Relations wi1!1. the United States (New York, 1962), II, pp. 176-183. 
Hennessey, 236. 
Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York, 1971), pp. 247-249. 
3Thomas, 247-249. 
10 
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( 
on the isl·and began to look to America for aid. It was 
hoped that by annexation to the United States the Cuban 
slavocracy might survive in conjunction with those of like 
interests on the great plantations of the American South. 
As early as 1810, representatives were sent by the planters 
of Cuba to the United States to indicate their interest in -
annexation, on the condition that America guarantee that 
Great Britain, who herself had a commercial interest in the 
West Indies, would not intervene. Many creole planters 
were hesitant to take such a drastic step, but slave revolts 
in the period from 1842-44 caused. enough apprehension among 
these interests to gain significant force for the movement.4 
It was unrealistic to expect Spain voluntarily to 
surrender the island, but it was hoped that the United States 
might be ~illing to purchase it. It was in this direction 
that the principal efforts for annexation moved. Advocates 
of America's manifest destiny, those who believed the country 
should ultimately encompass the entire North American con-
tinent and other expansionists in the United States, located 
principally in the South, liked this idea. In view of their 
struggle against the northern abolitionists, the South 
would be aided by the addition of a slave state. This 
would guarantee the precarious balance that existed in the 
American Senate between the number of representatives who 
advocated slavery and those who did not. 
Under the Polk administration an offer was made to 
purchase Cuba for the pI'ice of 100 million dollars. This 
----·-------------·-------·--------
4 . Foner, 9-19. 
11 
was immediately rejected by Spain because they had no in-
tention to part with such a valuable possession. They were 
also fearful that the sale might, be deemed by other nations 
as an indication that Spain could not maintain control of 
th:e island and was, therefore, forced to sell it. Spain 
was an extremely proud nation and had no wish to injure her 
reputation. 
Pro-slavery advocates in the United States did not 
yield easily and William Marcy, secretary of state under 
President Franklin Pierce, instructed the new American am-
/ bassador to Spain, Pierre Soule, to offer as much as 130 
million dollars for Cuba. If that should be insufficient, 
he should use any means to acquire the island. This second 
offer was likewise rejected and, as a result, President 
Pierce called for a conference of American diplomatic agents 
in Europe to discuss the situation. What resulted from this 
/ 
meeting of Soule, James Buchanan, United States ambassador 
to Great Britain, and French ambassador John Mason was the 
Ostend Manifesto, a document which, in effect, stated that the 
figure offered most recently was adequate for the purchase 
of Cuba. If the island could not be obtained for that price, 
the United States would consider going to war to obtain it. 
Public opinion at home and abroad forced the secretary of 
state to repudiate the document. 
With the victory in 1860 of the Republican party, the 
remaining chance for Cuba to be annexed to the United States 
lay in the victory of the South in the War Between the States. 
This·possibility vanished, though, when the Confederacy 
realized that to acquire the Caribbean island was to alienate 
12 
the European support upon which they depended for their own 
survival. 5 
Simultaneously with the decline of annexationism, 
a movement began with the expectation of internal reform 
in Cuba. The goals of this movement included a limitation 
upon the powers of the Captain-General and the extension to 
Cuba of basic political rights allowed citizens in Spain. 
The reform leaders concentrated upon the tenet of represen-
tation prior to taxation. The reformists, as they were 
known, were composed primarily of former leaders of the 
annexationists but were principally creoles (Spaniards of 
Cuban birth). With few exceptions, the members of this 
group were second class citizens. They were unable to hold 
government jobs and were excluded from the clergy, judiciary, 
the higher ranks of the military, and other.professions. 
Most creoles were forced to remain on their plantations, 
while the political life of the island was controlled by the 
urban peninsulares. Both classes had had a common interest 
in the previous period, for they had each sought the perpet-
uation of slavery. Now, the creoles began to realize both 
that abolition was inevitable and that the institution was 
5samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1957), pp. 313-314, 320-323. 
Samuel 
United States 
Foner, 
F. Bemis, !~ Latin American Polic:y: of the (New York, 1943), pp. 95-96. 
20-40, 96-103. 
Lester D. Langley, !he Cuban Policy of the United States (New York, 1968), pp. 24-26, 42-48. 
Thomas, 208-232. 
13 
~conomically impractical, with ·contract labor being less 
expensive. As a result, they became committed to the 
eventual abolition of slavery, a reversal of their previous 
position. In 1865 the Partido Reformista was formed. Its 
objective was to bring administrative reform to both Cuba 
and Puerto Rico. 6 
In Puerto Rico, in Sep;tember 1868, revolution was de-
clared. A month later in Spain Queen Isabella II was de-
,,, 
posed. When Luis Figuerdo hung a Spanish tax collector on 
his plantation, events quickly spiraled in Cub.a. Captain-
General Lersundi attempted t.o arrest tl1e reform leaders and 
a rebellion spread throughout the island. At the plantation 
of Yara, in October, revolution was formally declared. 
For most of the war, the rebel fo·rc.~s numbered between 
· ten and t,ven·ty thousand. They were confined t·o the hills in 
the eastern po·rtions of the island, with small enclaves in 
the area of Puerto Principe. Poorly equipped and operating 
as mobile guerilla bands rather than a la .. rge command., they 
were numerically in.feri.or to the regular Spanish forces. 
They could only d.epend :fo:r support upon their own spirit 
-and the abilities of their leaders, such as Maximo Gt'mez and 
Antonio -l~aceo, who would· :uI·timately bring them success twen-
ty years later in tbe second war for independence~ 
In April of 1869, a constitutional convention was held 
at Guamario and Manuel de Cespedes was elected President with 
6Thomas, 111, 109,233-234,246. 
Langley, 3. 
.; 
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Manuel Quesada as Commander-In-(.;hief of the revolutionary 
forces. Slavery wa·s declared illegal and a resolution 
passed in favor of American annexation. It was hoped that 
both these declarations might persuade the United States to 
,, . 
offer their assistance in the coming struggle with Spain.7 
On 1~ovember 5, 1873, at 5: 20 in the afternoon, the 
American State Department received word from the United 
States Consul in Ifavana, Henry C. Hall, t~a~ the ship Virgin-
!_us, a s.uspected blockade runner, had, been captured off the 
coast of Jamaica by the Spanish gunboat Tornado and forced 
into the port of S.antiago de Cuba. The official state bul-
.leti·n indicated th.at a qualified tribunal was in the process 
of trying the one hundred sixty-five passeng.ers .. and c.rew who 
were captured with the vessel.a 
.fo F·or five years an undeclared s.t.-ate of ·ins11rrection 
h.ad existed in Cuba and Santiago was in the heart .of rebel 
t·~rritory. When the Vi .. rginius arrived in port it created 
mu.ch excitement among tr1e to\vnspeople and, out of curiosity, 
·they gathered in the bay on sma,11 ships from which music. 
could ·be heard celebrating the event. 9 
For the first few days following the capture, the 
7Thomas, 233-2630 
8Hall to Fish, November 5, 1873; House Executive 
Documents,43rd Congre~s 2nd Session, I, No.716. 
Hall to Davis, 1'Iovember 5, 1873; · House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No.718. 
9Hall to Davis, N·ovember 7, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
· 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 720, From the -,Diario. -J 
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:p:~rticulars slowly filtered through the no.rma:l diplomatic 
-channels to the State Department. A number of reports were 
received late in Washington as the result of poor commun-
,ication. E.G. Schmitt, the American Vice-Consul in Santiago, 
reported to the State Department that the Governor of Oriente 
Province, General Juan- Burriel, had earlier received a 
telegram· from the Spanish consul at l{ingston that the Vir-
ginius was near 1~1orrant Bay in Jamaica 8;Ild he communicated 
with the commander of the Tornado which set sail four hours 
----
later. The Tornado was under little steam and full sail 
when she first sighted the Virginius at 2: 30 P .r~r. on the 
31st of October. She proceeded full steam for the vessel and 
after a chase of several hours, in which she fired four gun-
shots and a shell, the Virginius hoisted the American flag 
and surrendered. Horses, arms, and provisions had been 
thrown overboard or burnt as fuel to no avail. Officers from 
the Spanish ship boarded her at ten o'clock in the evening 
:a·nd after being presented with \vhat appeared to be valid 
American sailing papers and a dispatch for Colon in Panama, 
hoisted the Spanish colors. The next evening at five o'clock 
both vessels arrived at Santiago after sailing eighteen hotirs 
under full steam.10 
The only arms found on board were carbines ·of eighteen 
shots and some hand guns, but the prize catch was the dis-
~ tingushed passengers: Pedro Cespedes, brother of the insur-
gent president;_c-,·a son of ·Manuel Quesada; ana three other 
l?Hall to Davis, November 7, 1873; House Exe;c. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 720, Inclosure from E.G. Schmitt. 
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. / . prominent revolutionaries: Jesus d·el .Sol, Bernabe Varona 
alias Bembetta, and an American, General W .A.C. Ryan. 11 
In the United States, the Grant administration was 
as yet unwilling to commit itself. Though not entirely 
devoid of leadership, the men who composed the .Pr·esid,ential 
cabinet were chosen, for the most part, becausE3 of ·their 
personal friendship with Grant, rather than their adminis-
trative abilities. A man of vastly superior military talent, 
Ulysses S. Grant had little skill in evaluating and objec-
tively selecting from the advice of his peers. Fortunately, 
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish was able to maintain a 
semblance of cohesion .and good. judgement within the cabinet, 
a body which could easily have influenced the President 
l·nto bl 
_o·.f· act1·on· .12 an unreasona e course 
Fish, a descendent of Peter Stuyvesant, was born into 
a wealthy New York family at the beginning of the century. 
His f'ather, a local politician, had been a patriot during the 
revolution and had introduced his son to a number of prom-
inent revolutionary leaders. He became well acquainted with 
the sons of Alexander Hamilton, for whom his father was 
second at his d:uel with Burr. After graduation from Colum·bia, 
Fish studied in the office of Peter Jay, the eldest son of 
the supreme court justice, and was admitted himself to the 
bar of New York state in 1830. Fish reflected an aura of 
llHall to Davis, November 5, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 718, Inclosure from the nGazette." 
12Allan 1~evins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of 
the Grant Administration (liew York, 1936), pp. 111, 132-140. 
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dependability. In congress for one term in 1846, he sub-
sequently was chosen lieutenant governor, governor and 
senator of New York. After repeated rejections of Grant's 
offer of secretary of state, he reluctantly accepted, in 
spite of the fact that his wife had been seriously ill and 
he had personally-i never desired the glory of public office. 
Fish's most notable achievement was the settlement of the 
war claims arising from Great Britain's aid to the Confeder-
acy. It was principally through his efforts that the Treaty 
of Washington in 1871 obtained reparation for the United 
States as the result of damage caused to the Union by the 
English built ship Alabama. 
Fish was unlike the other members of the cabinet. 
Though he lacked moat of the personal ambitions which often 
accompany a man in his position, he was honest, industrious 
and dedicated to the welfare of his country, characteristics 
which the administration desperately needed. Only a man 
like Hamilton Fish could possibly hold the cabinet together.13 
On the seventh of November, Hamilton Fish telegraphed 
the legation in Spain expressing the seriousness of the si-
tuation. The capture of a vessel bearing the American flag 
was not to be taken lightly and summary proceedings result-
ing in the imposition of the death penalty would be a crime 
against humanity and frowned upon in an age of civilization. 
The United States would demand reparation if an American 
citizen were executed.14 The day before, the American 
_______ , __________________________ _ 
13Nevins, 1-19, 131-141, 474-493. 
14Fish to Sickles, November 7, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 585. 
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Ambassador to Spain, Dan Sickles, had read of the events 
himself in the Official Gazette and, without waiting for 
word from his government, sent instructions to the Captain-
General of Cuba to defer action against the passengers and 
crew until orders were received from Spain.15 
In the afternoon, Sickles attempted to meet with the 
Spanish foreign.minister, Jose Carvajal, to indicate that 
the situation might be a good opportunity for Spain to ini-
tiate a "more generous policy in respect to their conduct 
of the Cuban war," and that Captain-Ger1eral Jovellar should 
be instructed to wait until he received instructions before 
proceeding. Carvajal was not available, and Sickles was 
forced to leave a message to that effect. 
Later in the evening, however, Sickles was able brief-
ly to discuss the matter with the Spanish President, Castelar. 
He said that there had been previous summary executions and 
that if it shoultlbe found that the Virginius was flying 
the American flag, it co,uld be expected that the United 
States would demand the immediate release of both the ship 
and all those who were captured on board. He also asked 
Castelar to,: communicate to Jovellar the· same message. that he 
had left with his minister earlier that day. Castelar, with 
his usual cordiality, listened patiently to Sickles comments 
but replied, thereafter, that at seven that morning he had 
telegrammed those very orders to Cuba. He instructed Jovellar 
that the death penalty was not to be imposed on a non-com-
batant without the prior consent of the Cortes, the highest 
l5sickles to Fish, November 6, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 584. 
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legislative body in Spain, and not to be imposed on a -con-
firmed rebel ,,i thout an order fro!l1. :himself. Though Sickles 
had heard that a large number of t.h:e: deputies in the Cortes 
had encouraged Castelar to pro.hi bit th·e death penalty, it 
wa·s the Spanish President's own inten·tion to promote cordial 
.re··1ations between his country and the, Un.i ted States •1 6 
In tl1e meantime, lllhile an at·titude .of mutual respect 
seemed to point toward an aznicab·le resoluti·o·n of the cris.i·s·, 
th.e British government had .d.j.red.ted their warship Niobe to 
Santiago in order to protect the citizens Of that nation 
·who .had. also been reported: on board tr1e Vi:r:ginius at the time 
of her capture. lVIr. Nunes, of the ··united States consulate 
in Kingston, telegraphed at midnight to Commander Cushing 
of the United States steamer !YOming, then at Aspinwall, of 
·the events in Cuba and, leaving it at his discretion, sug-
gested an American vessel rnight be needed to protect the 
interest~ of the American citizens.17 
·T.he next day Sick.le:s· met with Carvajal to discuss the 
principles which he felt applied to the situation. In the 
:f.i,.r:st place, Spain. h.ad never admi.'t.·ted tr1at an insurrection 
had ,existed on the island, n.·or· 11:ad: t:·he United States re-
cc)grrized. the belligerents. 
If Spain were to ~·dtn:it: the ex-isten·ce of an insurrection, 
it would not only be ·an· ,admission of her own lack of 
16Sickles to Fish, 1~·ovember 7, 1873; House Exec.· Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 586. 
17Nunes to Davis, November 15, 1873; House Exec~ Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Seas. No. 731. 
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authority but would be further reason for other nations 
to grant belligerenew:, status to the Cuban insurgents and, 
therefore, open the road for unlimited foreign aid to the 
rebellion. The United Stat~s officially declared that the 
i_nsurrecti on lacked the stability necessary to be recognized. 
It did not have a c-api tal., ports, or territory under its 
control, nor did it- l1ave a government that could receive 
envoys. Unofficially, however·, the S:tate Department's 
opposition to recognition wae based upon the fact that Fish 
was then seeking to .justify the claim against Great Britain 
for damag:e: ca;us.ed ·by the !!labama au ring the Civ1·1 War, on 
the grounds that England had unjustifiably recognized the 
:Confederacy. Now, if neither nat.i-on had recognized a state 
of rebellion on the islamid, r.10\1· c·ould Spain justify the 
:s-ei zure of the Vir_ginius on the basi,s that it was bringing_ 
~1.d tb the rebel forces?l8 
Furthermore, tl1e Tornado had exc.eeded" hJ,r otm juris-
diction by capturing a vessel on the open -~eas which had 
been sailing under the fl.ag of a foreign nation. There would 
}Jave been no question of th.e Tornado's right to capture the 
,s:hip had the y~rginiu~ been in Cuban waters, but she had 
not. Lastly, Sickles felt that a fair trial; should be af-
forded all prisoners since this was stipulated in the seventh 
article of Thomas Pinckney'a treaty in October of 1795.19 
18Foner, 201-204. 
-··.-
,--·Nevins, 181, 690. 
19Treaty of Friendship, Limits and N'avigations; 
October 27, 1795; Treaties and Other International A-cts 
of the United States Article VII, pp. 312-313. 
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. . Carvajal replied that the Span.'ish. ,government would· 
immediately consider the legality of· the capture and reac·h 
a decision on the matter. Sickles ·continued that a pre-
cedent had already been set by the !:,loyo Aspinwall and 
that recently the case of the Deer had presented a similar 
problem. The latt~r ·Gase involved an English ship which 
was captured off of the coast of Spain in the Bay of Biscay, 
carrying arms and muni tio.ns- for the Carli st rebels. In 
that situation, Spain had released ·bO't·h the s.:hip and those 
who were on board.20 
Consul Nunes' suspicions had bee:n ·well taken for, 
shortly after Sickles return to the legation, Carvajal wa .. s 
.annou.nced tl1ere to inform the American :minister that, before 
. / t·h-e orders of the sixth were receive·d in Cuba, Cespedes, 
Bembetta, Jesu's del Sol and anothe-r ·haq ·been executed by the 
authorities.2lcarvajal him-se.lf had jl1st heard by way of an 
qfficer of lesser rank i.n Cuba. 
In Washington the :re.action was ·re'l-ative·ly mild. Fish 
e:Jtp:te.ssed r1is disapproval of the ex:-ecytions. If the respon-
siblEf pfi.rti.e.s were not pro'j;>.Err.J..y punished, it would show tl1at 
Spain had n-0 control over the island and, therefore,some 
other pow·~r· must, meaning, of course, the ir.ist.1rgents. 
I.n· effect, the island was not ·controlled ·by Spain at 
all, nor was it by the insurgents. Rather, it was the 
20sickles to Fish, November 8, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 589. 
2lsickles to Fish, November 8, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 588. 
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Volunteers, a loose o·:rgani zation of middle and Upper class 
peninsulares who had become the main political force on the 
island and who controlled the Captain-General himself. 
Actually, the Spanish President Emilio Castelar was 
if :~¢st sympathetic. He expressed his regret and disapproval 
of the .executions, noting that he had addressed several com-
:rrru·nications to. Jovellar for information on the incident. 
Fish proceeded to inform Sickles o·f his continued 
:co.nfidence in the Sp.ani.sh. government. This reaction was 
not totally due to the good Will of either Castelar or 
Secretary Fish, for there was ·stil.l. some question about the 
capture. Carvaja_l had inf6·rm.eo ·sickles thB.t the ~.irginillS 
:h.ad been see-n making a landing. on· th-e Cuban coast and was 
'.pursued to about t,venty-thre-e mile:s off the Jarnai.can coast-
before being taken. The Span·i.$h g·overnment also t·eli.:ev,ed. 
th.at the ship had. no consular ce.rtificate. 
The A.nte.rican Consul-General in Havana, Hen::ry H·a11, 
irtforrtred Jove.,llar that as the Yirginiu§. was not. captured 
i·n ·cu ban wa-ter:s and .. A.merican citizens were on board, no 
~ent$nce of: death c.ould be imposed until certain facts were· 
~ 
-
known. 22 It was the Spanish cont_etition, however, that t:tfe. · 
four who had been executed had b·een tried two years prior 
for repe_l_ activ-ities. All th.at wa.s needed for the sentence:s 
{Q ije carried out was positive identification. Word was 
not received by _Jovellar from Spain until the 5th, which 
·was ·a day late, and the executions occurred not as the 
22Hall to Davis, November 5, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 719, Inclosure: Hall to Jovellar. 
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result of summary proceedings, but- rather of no proceedings 
at all, owing to the fact·-~that sentences had been imposed 
longbefore.23 
In the meantime, telegraphic communications between 
Havana and Santiago had been cut by the insurgents, and the. 
American agents-.: were refused permission to see or speak to 
the American citizens in custody. Sickles protested that 
prisoners should be accorded their rights under article 
seven of the treaty of 1795. He~mentioned that the previous 
March, three American sailors on board the bark Union were 
refused a similar request on the premise tl1at war existed 
and thus only the rules: of a Spanish court martial were 
applicable. Carvajal ·ass·ure-d Sickles that the Governor's 
conduct was disapproved of· and that certainly war did not 
ex.ist. 24 
In Cuba the press, particularly the Diario, the Gaceta, 
-_@d. ·the rnouthpiece of the Volunteers, Voz de Cuba congratu-
1.ated Don Dionisio Costillo, the captain of the Tornado, and 
C:aptain-General Jovella.r for their fine work, and indicated 
that the island was entirely pleased over news of the cap-
ture. According to one source a subscription was taken up 
and $502.00 collected for a testimonial to Costillo, the 
-----------------------·-------·-
23sickles to Fish, November 10, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 590. 
24sickles to Fish, l~ovember 12, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 595, Inclosure: s·ickles to Carvajal, November 11, 1873. 
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officers and crew of the Tornado.25 
Despite the obvious joy among conservative Cubans and 
a hint of procrastination on the part of the Spanish govern-
ment, both sides appeared willing to act within reason. The 
situation was serious, but the restraint and good intentions 
exhibited by both parties led one to believe that the stage 
of crisis had passed. I.t was .not un.ti·l the twelfth of No~-·-., 
v.ember, however, that the grav'ity of the Yirg,inius ·.Affair . ~. . . 
b·ecame apparent. On that day the State Department received 
a communication from Henry Hall stating that on the seventh 
:and eighth Captain Joseph Fry, thirty-six members of the 
c:r:e-w of the Vir~inius and sixteen passengers were executed.26 
When the consul at Kingston received the news, he 
t·elegraphed Cusr1ing of the addi ti:o.nt1l deaths and strongly 
urged that several United States steamers be sent to Santi.ago. 
Cushing then telegraphed the consul in Santiago asking if 
the Virginius had been c·aptured, on the ltigh seas and if the 
lives of the crew had ·truly been threatened. On the ninth, 
·t.he commander received the reply, but it was too late· in the 
day for him to sail. On Monday ·the 10th at 10:00 A..M. the 
Wyoming sailed for Cuba. Later that day word was received 
by Nunes that they had stopped in Kingston to coal and would 
proceed shortly or the next morning. In the meantime, 
Cushing personally wrote to Burriel saying that had. the 
25Hall to Davis, November 5, 1873; 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sass. No. 719, Inclosure: de t;uba. 
-
House Exec. Docs. 
To Editor of Voz 
26Hall to Davis, November 12, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 723. 
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Y.irginiu§ been a pirate she could have been captured ·by· any 
. 
nation, but she was a smuggler or blockade runner at worst 
and by international law there :could be no right bf execu-
tion. 
Th.e next mo:rning: ,a/t. 1,.0:.3.0·,. shortly after the vlyoming 
'.i' 
bad l·eft, Nunes received word from f•1r. Schmitt by \vay of the 
F·rench mail steamer !?_esirade, suggesting a messaJge be sent 
to St. Thomas for a United States steamer. Nunes did that, 
only to fi·nd there were none avail.able, and communicated 
this in ·return to :S:antiago al.ong wit_h· the fact that a ship 
was already on it$ way.27 
On the seve:nth· of ··N·ove·mber:,_ tl1e l3ri:tish steamer Niobe 
h-,ad. :arrived in ·San:t·i_agc) _and Captain Lambton Lorraine demand-
·_e,d t-hat non_e 6:f t·he B.riti_·:9 h. :su bj.ec_ts be :ex:ecu ted. In an 
i.nterv·i·e·w l1eld b:eJ~-ween himself. and ·Burriel, Lorrai,ne a·.p:peal:ed 
·f'or· t'h:eir .l_i-·VE:rs until. he ·co1t-Id· ·present evid,ence on t.he-ir 
behal:f.. Specifical·ly, h·e ·ar-gued, Spain cou:ld not pursue a 
... . 
. 
B·ri.tis-h ·vessel outsi·de :Of t:e:rr.i to rial waters. . Al thoug~ it 
was an American sh·ip ·th-at was involved, the principle ap-
plied to Britis-h crewmen or passengers. Secondly, Spain 
could no:t tre·a.t the crew as prisoners of war for the sole 
re~son t11.at. the ship carried contraba~nd and military personnel. 
·T·h:f3'. crew mus·t be considered separately bec·aus.e .of the nature 
o:f their duties. In spite of his warning and that of the 
Jamaican Governor, the sixteen British subjects who were 
members of the crew were not spared. At that point Lorraine 
27Nunes to Davis, November 15, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 731. 
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turned the ship's guns on~the town and threatened to bom-
bard the city if further harm should come to a British 
subject, before an investigation by higher authorities. 
Burriel replied tha_t he wo,uld not: permit hims·.elf to be over-
awed by anyone. :T·he: .¢aptai:r1 _wa.s praised in America for this 
:a,9t.i_6h but Congres:s ·d:e:nied -~~ ·r.eso·lution i:n his hono:r :severa.1. 
:y·t:Jar-s later.28 
Hall belie-ve-d: t·ha:.t t·h.e tn·ten.t:l,otl. was for ·the executi:CYns: 
to t~e place b·efor.~ word c.oul·d be received from Spain to 
s··to:p tllem. :~T:l1i s: was substantiated ·by the fact that the 
g;overnQ:l." o--f Sa.,ntiago was ·ex.tre.rnely :z~::alous in his hatred o·t: 
the ·rebe·ls. 
The Spani s-h .re:ply tt). :si~}k1$Si was curt. In th·.e .fi:r:st-· 
place, the ship',s .. d_·ocuments were not auther1tica,t:e.d b.y the 
visa or c.e.rti.ficate of· _a con-sul and were- irregular in oth·er 
ways-.. A telegram had reac·hed Havana on t:hE3 s.eventh but it 
was tJ1en.t10'.o late to stop the punishment. Jovellar hf.ld 
r·eplied. to his go.vern-ment that he wollld 'Order B.·u-rr:i-.el t·o-
i.rrrmed_iate::ly· end the ·s·laug·hter.29 
Once again the Spanish government had responded 
28Hall to Fish, November_ 15, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 730. 
Cushing to Robeson, November 16, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 741. 
Report on Possible Resolution of Thanks to Lambton 
Lorraine; House Executivei.-Documents 43rd Congress 2nd Ses-.. ~. }~ 
sion lio. 781. 
29Sickles to Fish, November 13, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. Nos. 600, 602. 
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p·:romptly and courteously. Yet, there was that tinge of 
indifference and del~y wh·ich had often characterized Span-
ish-American diplomacy. The lack of respect for Spanish 
., 
authority and the need for direct control of the island 
had placed Spain in a peculiar situation. The capture of 
the '[irgini\).S had not- been intended by Spain, yet she 
would be held responsible. This time the State Department 
would not take the matter lightly, but would respond in a 
r 
manner unusual, its elf, in. r·e,lat:·i·on to American politics of' 
that period. 
·• 
Chapter II 
The Labors of Diplomacy 
The circumst~nces of the Jir~inius crisis made it 
necessary for negotiations to be held in Madrid. The United 
States initially sought reparations from Spain, and this 
could best be accomplished by direct contact with the 
Castelar government, rather than with a Spanish ambassador 
in Washington acting as an intermediary. 
The American public ,.,as sympathetic to the movement 
for Cuban independence because they believed it similar to 
the cause for which they had fought a century before. But 
panic and depression had fallen heavy on the nation a few 
months prior and memories of the War Between the States 
were vividly in the minds of many persons. Thus, there 
remained a hesitant attitude on the part of most Americans 
to allow themselves to become involved in something which 
they might regret.l 
This was not the case with Dan Sickles, the United 
States Ambassador to Spain. He was determined to acquire 
Cuba in spite of all obstacles. This was unfortunate, for 
it was his responsibility to present his nation's position 
to the Spanish government as accurately as it -was made 
---------------------------------
1Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic R!story of the American People (New York, 1968), pp. 379-381. 
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a.v-~'il:a.ble to him. 2 
Thriving upon i_n.tf'igJiie and adventure·,. ·mo.re prone to 
emotionalism than rational ·behavior, Sickles was not the 
man to represent the views of his country in a. ·complicat:ed. 
imbroglio. His talents ,1ere more suited to clomest·ic ·politics 
th.·an i:nternational diplomacy. In the New Yor.k legislature 
he was particularly ad.roi t at vote swappir1-g :ap·.d floorwork. 
He was an excellent d·eba·ter .a."nd used it to the advantage of 
anyone wl1o· could aid him i.n rris o~m. ambitions. He wanted 
"place and power" and -was: a ·i;n.aster wheeler-dealer. 3 Admit-
ted to the New York bar in 1846, only a year later he entered 
the -st:ate legislature. He subseq_11ently beca.me corporate 
c-c:,.11.nsel ,of: the city of l~ew York an·a_ resigned t·o- accept the 
_p.o·st o.f _s:ecretary of the United States legation. ·in London. 
T.·wo ye.·a:rs later he was elected state senator and s.erved as 
:a :Democratic c-ongressman from 1857 t:.o 1861. In February 
o.f 1859, S--ickle:s stiot and killed the son of Francis S-c.ott 
Key, who:, he had learned from· a friend, was having ail affair 
wi tl1 hi:s wife. 1-le \vas later freed on a technicality~ 
Dti·r·ing tr1e Civil War he rose to the rank·. of l'la·jo·r 
<tene-ral and at Gettysburg lost a leg, only adding to hi:s 
already eccentric personality. Later when Sickles finally 
left Spain, he became involy·ed in an affair with the exiled 
queen in Paris. In order n·ot. to aliena.te support for her 
son, Alphonso, who sought t.o. regain the throne, an arrange-
ment was made whereby Sickles married one rif Isabella's 
2Edgcumb Pinchon, 
"Yankee King of Sp1ain" 
3Pinchon, 21-23. 
Dan Sickles, Hero of Gettysburg and 
(Garden City, 1945), pp. 45, 226. 
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l:adies in waiting _in order that he might always be near 
her. The affair ended when Alphon.so became King at the end 
~ 
of the first republic. 
No doubt, the American minister ,vas .courageous and 
dete:rmined, yet he was overly passionate, and. his impetu-
Ol)s_i ty, flair for the dramatic, and ·desire to acquire ·Cuba 
helped bring his nation to the brink of war.4 
On November 14, 1873, having received the reports of 
ftd-d:iti.onal executions and informed by Fi sh to protest the .. 
.. 
a.cti:on but to act with the gr.ea:test of discretion, S:ick·le,s 
add:Ife·s:ised a harshly written n.ote to Carvajal: 
T:he undersigned is,. therefore, directed to protest, and, 
in the name of his Government and of humanity, he does 
hereby p·rotest against the said act. of the authorities 
in Cuba as barbarous and brutal, and an outrage upon 
this epoch of civili.zation; and t·he undersigned. is like-
·wi·se ordered to declare to his excellency the minister 
o:f state that the Government of the United States will 
demand the most ample reparation of any wrong which may 
·.h.ave been thereby committed ttpo.n any of its citizens or 
Upon its flag.5 . 
Carvajal's reply :-t::-o. t.:he n_o·t,e ·d.id not reflect his u,s:u:al 
·anriab il i ty: 
The: protest being thus rejected '"'i th serene energy, 
I have to fix my attention upon the harshness of style, 
and upon the heated and improper words you used to qual-
ify the condu·ct of the Spanish authorit.ies. If the 
document subscribed by you lacks the solemnity which 
might be lent to it by the right to address it to 
4Pinchon, 23ff. 
5sickles to Fish, November 14, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 606. 
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:me, the temperance of it:s fo.rm. ought, at' :1east ·t:o have 
demonstrated tl1at it wa:s: not dictated by pass.i·on. 6 
In this critical ·period there was a ·mental deadlock 
·between the Spanish minister of state, inteht upon preserv-
i·ng h:i.s n,ation' s pride, and Siokles who desiired to force 
·w~r ·u.pon the Uni tea. s·tates. 
"Th.e sign.ifict:tnce ot ·tnis became apparent when l:.at·e.r 
t.l1at day Fi.:s:h ·Spe.cified. the action which Sickles should 
t.ake • j ·He rr1.u:s.t :fi·r·st dernan·d the resto·ra.tion of the_ Virginius. 
. All peti.sons., pas·sen.gers or crew, sti.11 alive.'. s·hould then be 
handed· ove.r t.o: tl1e Un:ited States aut··hori ties. The American 
fla.·g was ·to p.e saluted. in. the port· of Santiago, and the 
i·.nd.ividuals ·wn.o were res.po!isible for the acts should 'be 
p·:rope·rly punished. If these dem.ands.- should not be met tfr· 
S·U.f.ficient reparation not offered, .Si.ckl.es· was instruct-e·d 
immediately to c-lose the:_~_lega.tfon an.d re·tu·rn· :l1ome. 7 
Having al.read.y created a situation adv·erse to a proper 
s.e·ttlemen t, and on.e in .. ~rhich Spar1ish: pricle was at sta.:k .. e:, 
·±t was to. be exp.ec·te·a· t·h11t Carvajal ':s:: on1.y answer was tJ1at· 
Spa.in woul.d. m~k:e re.paration if it should be determir1efi. that 
a violati·on had 'actua.lly occ11rred. Obvious.ly the serious-
.;ries.s of the demands .necessitated a more pro.per .answer. The 
United States l1ad, ·1n effe,ct, offered an ultimatum. Should 
the terms not be compliad with, the next siep could be open 
6sickles to Fish, November 16, 1873; §ouse Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 614, :Inclosure: Carvajal to Sickles. 
7Fish to Sickles, November 14, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Seas. No. 605. 
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conflict. Carvajal, on the othe.r hand, if he had sought 
to take a step 
do • view so, 1n 
• the honor ing 
• in 
of 
o'f a 
the direction of compromise, could not 
Sickles'belligerence, ·without compromis-
~ 
traditionally proud nation. 
S.ev.eral days later-, Carvajal assurea Sickles tha.t the 
Cuban au thori ti es were ordered. to permit .~merican represen-
_ t ati ves to see and converse with prisoners from their coun-
try, and all rights which would apply under normal c:uban 
judicial processes and the Treaty o·f 1795 would b~ complied 
with. However, on that day also, tl1e Spanish mi·nister 
restated his previou.·s declaration, that absolutely no ·re~ 
p.artiti.o.n would be Torthcoming until it cou.ld be proved 
that t:·he American charges were valid. S.hould that be shown, 
t·hey ,vould be pleased to make, r·ecornpe·nse. 8 
·Sickles l1ad no -i.nt-.et1ti.on of delaying until Spain 
·could offer this pro.of. :Qn. ·the l8t}1. of r{ovember he tele-
graphed the s:tate department that it was his un.derstanding 
that Carvajal' s reply meant, in eff.~crt_, a refu:sal to submit 
·-t:Q the demands of ·the 14th and he would, therefore, proceed 
to close and leave the legation. He would depart Spain fro~ 
Valencia for France, taking both the secretary and archives 
with him.9 A request was made for Admiral Case to come to 
8sickles to Fish, 1'1ovember 17, 1873; House Exec. Doc.§.:_ 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 620, Inclosure: Carvajal to Sickles. 
~-:..sickles to Fish, November 17, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. -843, Inclosure: Carvajal to Sickles. 
9sickies to Fish, November 18, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 625. 
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· Valencia from Nice to transpo·rt ·he and: hJ~.s !·~ntiiX.y: frt)rn 
Spain.10 
Actually, little 1-1as ·t-hen kno·wn of what had: t-:raD,s.;..; 
pirea in Cuba. At times.- re.ports were received in both 
capitals- th-at the adri.i tiona.I executions had never· taken· 
p __ l<ice -ancl, on other occasio'r1s, there were rumors o·f more 
s-:hootings .11 One tt1ing was certain; feeli11gs bega_n to run 
high. The Virginius r1ac1 arrived in Havana on t:h.e, 1.4tl1. 
,Gua.r.rls were stationed at the en.trance to t-h.e. co_nsulate in 
Uav·ana to prevent American agents from wiring· their supe.r--
iors. Trey were as.ked to withdraw b:ut sta.ted that their 
·orclers came fr.o:m th.e command'.ing. offi-cer at: the j.ail. In 
:Sp.~in the pre-s-s. had: alr-eady demande-d t]1e ous:t:e_.r of Sickles 
and _o.ne night a mob ha:.d gat.-her·e.d to- .s:ack t}1.e: 1-ega~ion, o.r1l.y 
·to be. ·-t11:rned away by the_ au·tn.orit:ies •. 12· 
There han been, since the out.break o.f t_h~ :T-eh Years 
War, stron·g sympatl1y for the insu_rge11t:s i·n A:m.eri.;c:~, from 
the publ.ic a,rid within official c.·i.rcles, pri-ncipa:lly in the 
:d'.irection .. o·f dip.lomat-ic rec:c)g;nition. l•lost Ame,ri.qans, how-
ever, \vere aware .of the· il.1-egJtimate activities o-f. the 
Virginius, ann most. J~e,v York pap\ers clecl-ared that· the demand 
for war did not really exist. Nonetheless, the major 
lOsickles to Fisl1, November 18, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41.s..t Cong. 2nc1 Sess. No. 627. 
llsickles to Fish, November 18, 1873; !louse Exec. Docs. 
41-·s·t Co·ng. 2nd Sess. No. 622, :Inclosure: C~rvajal to Sickles. 
12Sickles to' Fish, N·ovember 19, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Seas. No. 631. 
,, 
pro-insurrection:ist p1tblication in the country, Dana's 
New York §.1!!!., as well as other: propagandists associated 
with the Cuban Junta in New Yo·rk, continued to play up the 
issue· and there 1,ras an i-ndication that the government was 
at ·1east seriously con.sid.ering the possib.il.it-:y of war with 
S:pain. 
In t-he. afternoon o·f tbe 18·t:h· ·o·f. Nove~ber tr1e Spanish 
minister in Washington; tJ1er p·ersonable Admiral Polo J)' Ber-
nabe, transmitted a. no:te .directly from his superiors. ·t9 
Fish indicati-ng that t.here was evidence of :na, conspiracy of 
sorts•• to ac·t in: ¢:onnec·t:ion with a lan.d,.i_ng· t:y the Virginius 
qn Guba. The, ship haci ·b-een known to. I.and military supplies 
:on J).r·eviou.s cJcciision:s .and. i .. t: was ,pro·babl·e that tl1is \vas her 
· intention on._th·:i_s occEtsion·. Fu_r-thermore, it appeared that. 
her paper:s _ were- -rio·t ent_i rel_y in orde-r. Should, not the 
United ,s·t.a.tes gove·rnmer:tt awa.it fu:·rt·h.er evide-nce before taking 
an;y· action on the· basis of th·e facts that appeared to be 
d_e"treloping? The captain of the ship had admitted t:he exis-
t.ence of a conspiracy and. S.p:ain needed only time to prove 
tJre-se facts~l3 On th:e- basis .of this n,ote and a communication 
from Hall contradicttP.l{ t·he. r·eports of a.d_cli:t·tonal deaths, 
Fish, who obviou_s·ly was more p.ron_e to a peaceful solution 
:i¥-<i. 
than his. amba.ss.ador, instructed Sickles to re:.m.ain in Madrid 
·and that no ve·ssel woul(1 be sent. Spain wouln be given 
~ntll- the :26th .of November to ascertain the facts of the 
.. 
~ ~ . ' 
•. ·. :.- ! •. .. ~ - ~ <:i.. - " 
13Polo to Fish, N·ovember 18, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 693. 
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case. 14 
Sickles:, ,~3-;t:fll e-x_pecting _more drastic measures from 
his superiors· co:nt.tn1re.d to make arrangements to leave. 
The Italian government granted permission to their charge 
d'affairs in Madrid, Count Jvlaffei, to handle American in-
terests there and to take over the library and othEtr 
.. 
··p .. roperty of the Uni.ted: States legation, shoulrl ·he r:ec.ei_v.,e 
sp:ecifi c inst.ructions frorn \Yashington.15 
·T.he ambassador's susp.ic.ions were no:t -en.t:irely unfound-
:e:d: f.or: ·On the 25th there had still been no :official ·word 
·;rr.01n ·S.pain concerning a resolution of the ,questions at 
issue betwe.en t:i1e t,wo nat:i<>ns. Fish, t.herefore, cabled• 
Ivl.adr-id that if no word was received from Spain by l.at.e the 
r1ext day, the original i.risttu.c-tions to S:i_ckles should: be 
:complied 1-vith and he sho11·1a. leave the country.16 
On the morning of t·he 26th of ._llo·v·ember a message cante 
to Sickles from Carvajal .saying that Sp·ai·n "would, recognize 
the princip.les" upon which the Americ·an demand wa.s based and 
tnak;e .r.e.par.ation by the 25t:h of De.camber if the f-acts warrant-
·e_d it. Sickles replied tha.t wh.:en h·e received an official 
communication to that effect r1e ,vould defer his departure 
---------------------·------------
14Fish to Sickles, November 19, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 1'10. 636. 
15Sickles to Fish, November 20, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 639. 
Fish to Sickles, November 20, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 637. 
Fish to Sickles, November 21, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No •. 640* 
±§Fish to Sickles, N·ovember 25, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No·. 646. 
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and forward it to Washington.17 
r . 
By t,.,o o'clock P.M. no correspondence had been re-
ceived from the Swanish authorities and Sickles formally 
requested his passports. A half hour later he received a 
communication from the minister of state who had finally 
become convinced of the seriousness of the A.merican demands. 
Carvajal stated first that if it should be. determined on or 
before December 25 that the documents of the Virginius 
were in proper order and that the ship was legally enti-
tled to carry the American flag, then Spain would proceed 
to salute the fl~g, declare the seizure improper and re-
turn the ship, surviving passengers and crew. If it was 
found that the authorities in Cuba had violated the pro-
viaion of any treaty or Spanish legislation they would be 
pr.op:er.l·y arraigned. -Al·l oth·er claims of either government 
woul--d be handled d·iplomatically and i.f no agreement was 
re.ac·he-d _submitted to impartial arbitra·tion. Lastly, that if 
on tl1e 25th, Spain had not "resolved the questions," it 
·would be considered as if a decis .. ion had been .. made in favor 
.of the- United States .18 
By· the 28th- of r~ov.ember, Sickles had received no 
reply from Washington to the latest Spanish proposal. On 
that basis he telegrammed the state department, "In conform-
ity to your instructio:q bf the 25th, I have awaited your 
Docs. 
-
17sickles to Fish, November 26, 1873; House Exec. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 649. 
18sickles to Fish, November 26, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 651; Inclosure: Carvajal to Sickles. 
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ora ers in reply to the propositions cabled you at 5 in the 
afternoon of the 26th. Assuming that you regard them as 
inadmissible, I propose, unless meanwhile I receive other 
instructions from you, to renew my request for my passports 
.at 3 o'clock this day.nl9 
On that d_ay, however, Fish r$Ceived Sickles• first 
:n·ote and informed .Admiral Polo th:at the United States 
would not accept th~ proposition. Spain could not retain 
possession of _the !irginius while seeking to justi£y the 
tb~ captur.e. It was his understanding now that S·ickles had 
already left Madrid, for he had. not received a no·te sent 
:from Spain to the contrary o_n. t-he 25th. Polo then informed. 
him that negotiati.on·s: were• continuing. W11en Fisl1- shortly· 
aft·er rec-eived another dispat.ch indicating that Sickles w:ou·l·d 
__.. 
. . ' 
requ·est ·11ls __ p·as·sports, the confus-ion appa:rently p.rom·pted h.i.rri. 
t.o de.cide that it ,,ould be more reaso·nabl e to ho'ld the: 
·n$got.iations solel_y in 1n/ashington because -o·f t·h_e ob.viou..s: 
d.:iffic-u:lties. in ·communication. In ad.dit.iox1:, t:he ,latest 
·,propos,al had ·been made t~y Spain and i·t was the Ur.ii·t$d S-t,atc:e-~s· 
wI1ich: should respond virith a co.un·ter.propo·sa1 .• 20 
On tl1e 29th of Jlovem:ber ,. s·ic_l{les urgently tel•egramm,ed 
the: st·,aj·te q.·e_partrn:e::r1t th-at b:_ef·o.r.e ·t·h.ree o'clock o.f -th·e 28t11 
:t1ie.. :ne·go,t_.iat-ions 'woul(1 11.a/ve: been terminated in Madrid, be-
c·ause Spain had acceded to almost all of the demands of the 
19sickles to Fish, November 28, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 657. 
20Fish to Sickles, l~ovember 28, 187'3; ·aouse Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 660. 
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14th. All that was needed for an acceptable solution was 
proof of the nationality of the Virginius, which would not 
be difficult .. · to acquire. It was not the satisfaction of 
a possible solution, however, which excited Sickles, but 
rather that he had been informed at twelve noon on the 28th .. · . 
by Carva·jal:, that a solution had already been :reached in 
Washington.21 Sickles, of course, had no,t re·c.eiv·ed woT:d from 
r1is government that nego.-tiations had ev~r pe:en held in 
Washington. n.r·.t is :regretted I was not notifie·d of the ne-
gotiations. :·in Wa:shington. The English legation here ·l.S 
better in.f,orrn·e.d by ·1t:.s government of ,vhat transpires in 
Washingto11 on this. subject t:han th,is le.gation. 1•22 
Ther··e: had bt3en d.i.ffict1lt..y i:n communication through-
c>u.t -t:n:·e crisis, but th:is· ·s:i.tuation ·r~presented a complete 
b:re·ak·down. in. th.e<.trans:fer of inf·ormation between the s.tate 
,dep~.rtrr1:ent and the legation in Spain. Actually, negot·iations 
had proceeded in Washington from as far back as the 12th. 
'On the- 21st, the possibil.ity ·of arbi tra.tion. had. b.ee,t1 .dis-
:c:u·:ssed e Hovrever, in a meeting wi.th P:o·.10, .Fi.sh expressed 
h.i.s ·b·e.li.e:f that the in.oiden.t i·nvolv.ed a q:ues:tion of national 
ho·nor ·~t1:d the.refore coul·d not.: be submitted. to. a."rbi tration • 
....... 
America had been insul't·e.d by th.e Spani:,sh action. The Vir-
ginius was flying the American flag ancl carrying United 
21sickles to Fish, November 28, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 659. 
. . 
Docs. 
22sickles to Fish, November 23, 1873; House Exec • 
41st Cong. 2nd. Bess. No. 661. 
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States papers.. Re·ferring to the cas.e. cJf the ~labama, Fish 
stated that an apology \vas first received from Great Bri-
tain before arbitration hearings were convoked. It was 
obvious to the secretary -t}1.at Spa.in felt little sorrow at 
the executions: and· :he w.as particularly incensed at the vio-
1:"atipn of· the 1-795 treaty; specifically the refusal of 
cu·ba .. to: provide legal counsel for th_e priso.ners, t-he :refusal 
' to ·allow Un.ited States agents at t_he t·rial$· and p_resenta....;: 
t:ions of e·\rid·E3n¢e, and simply the reten·t:ion of those who 
·we:re. not etx:~cutea.. Und:er those c-onditions, Fish did not 
:.f·e-el t_ha.t· arbitration v1ould be appropriate. }le felt tha·t 
0 th}.9-- :nation must be the. ·Judge. n23 -
Finally, on t:he. 27th of rrovernl:r$it an agre.ement was 
reached. Sho,rt.ly after F'ish- informe·d the Sparti.sh ambassa-
dor that he would not accept any solution ·whic·h. allowed 
Spain to retain. the Virginius for any per·i.ocl., .Polo replied 
tbat h-e \fas authorized to make a further rec·-ommena.ation: 
Admiral .Polo then stated that he had received a 
strictly confidential and personal comn1unication, re--. ( _;··. _,~ -
questing to be informed ·if it be possible to make an 
arrangement whereby, if the vessel and men be given up, 
1'lr. F:if.sh would engage that inquiry be instituted, and, 
if the result requirea, that punishment should be in-
flicter.! on those ivho had. viol.9.,ted a .. ny laws of the United 
States, reserving, until furth·er information, the salute 
t.o the flag_. 
The only- conditio:n -wa:s. t:·oat the United States, s.h:ould 
i·nstitute an i.ngµ.iry o-f its own, and if it should be deter-
mined before ·t-he· 25:t·h. of December that the Virginiu.s did not 
have the right to fly the American flag, that proceedings 
-------------·---------.. ---------
23Interview Between Polo and Fish, November 21, 1873: House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 696. 
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would begin aga·i.nst ·tlte ves·sel and those who had violated 
the law. 
The secretary's reply to th,ls newest propo~ition was 
favorable: 
After a short interval and absence, Mr. Fish, 
having consulted ,vi th the President, replied that if 
Spain should make this proposal, ·and should forthwith 
surrender the vessel and the survivors of her passen-
gers and c.rew, tl1e propooal would be accepted, • • • 
The salute to th~ flag was to be delayed until the 
·2·5t'h' of December at ,,.,h.ich time i.t. would b·e. d'is:pensed with 
sr1ould it be p·roved· t,l-iat t.he .s.hip was :tmp:.r~·optfrly registered • 
. In any C·ase .S.pain mu·:s:t apologiz·e for an i·ndign.ity to .. the 
flag and must irtv~s,tigat.e t·h.e. c.ond'u:ct of .any ·p.ers·on. who 
might. :hav·e vi.olated her own l.·aws.. Other reciprocal recla-
ni·at·.ion.s ·wou·lq. l}e p·rope.-fl:y consid:.ered. 24 On the 29th a for-
mal co.nference was held. between Polo D 'Bernabe and Hamil ton 
F:i,.sh. In spite of· Sickles' obj ect·ions a protocol was signe.:d .• 
It· was speci·fied that arra.ngment:s· for ·th.e transfer of the 
s'ltip ,vould be rnad e within two day Er~ 2·5 
1~:o doubt, Fish tra.d .. ·ret.re:ated. s.ubstantial.ly from his 
earlie.st position. The to·ne of .his initial demands indicat-
ed th.at t.he United States v,oul-d accept nothing less than 
·full com.pl iance with the ult:i.matum. There was no allowance 
for the possibility that· Spain migh~t have been justified in 
---------------------·------------
24rnterview Between Polo and Fish, November 27, 1873; 
House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No~ 704. 
25Protocol of Conference Between Polo ,and Fish, Novem-
ber 29, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 708. 
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t·he seizure, or at least that an investigatioD: would be 
possible. The fact that Spain would now be given until 
the 25th of December to determine where the responsibility 
:might lie was allowing that the United States could, itself, 
be partially accol1ntable for th~ actions of the Virginius. 
The ag.r·eement signed. on the 29th of liovember was 
reached through the coopera·tiv·e efforts of Hamil ton Fish 
and the Spanish ambass.ador, Folo D'Bernabe. Sickles had 
d_on.e al.:1 that he could .. to _pr:eve:nt a peaceful accord.. He 
ti:ad teil·egtamm·ed to the sta:t-e department provocatory corre-
Il_p·onde·nce fro.m. the Madrid ·government and sent through nor-
rn:aI channe·ls communications which indiqa·t~d a -c,ono.iliatory 
a.:tti··t:ud·:e on t.-he part. of Spain. On several occ~si-ons, he 
purposely misinterpreted notes from Carvajal. :He would 
immediately forwar·d his own und.erstanding o.f the message, 
which was. f·requently tainted by h_is pe,rso·na-1 inte·rest in 
acq_uir-ing -Cuba, and several days later would .. send the actual 
.mes.9.age to \iasl1ing·ton.. Fortunately, the relation that 
developed b.etween F'i·s,h· and Polo was.·: more cordial than 
that betwe:en Sic:kle.s: ;a_nd Carvajal. Fi._·sh .understood the 
proble1ns· whi:c:h. ·\'tere .f:aced by the n·ewl·y :e·s:talYl:is·h~d federal 
·republj.c in Spain, and once h-is irtiti._al indignation had 
pass-ed he was more inclined.· t·o an amic··able settlerr1ent than 
hi.:·s m-i-rti st er. 
In any event, the s.olu.tion outlined in the protocol 
was temporary. The chara..-.cter of the Vi rginius had still 
to be determined and must- be· presented by the 25th of the 
next month. Doubts had already been raised as to th~ ship's 
true nature and destination, and Spain had just begun to 
conduct hearings into the matter in New York. 
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Chapter III 
-~-
A Divided Verdict 
In view of the demands andaggressive attitude of 
the United States government, it was surprising that an 
accord, specifying the requirements for an end to the Vir-
~inius crisis, should be reached. Even less to the credit 
of the State D}epartment and the American fiiplomatic Service 
was the fact that the settlement had been virtually forced 
upon the Spanish republic when little information had been 
revealed concerning the legal status of the ship or the 
facts surrounding the incident. Only then did the State 
Department realize the extent of the concessions which the·_y 
had obtained from Spain. 
On December 2, 1873, two days after the protocol was 
signed, there had been no word from Spain concerning the sur-
render of the Virginiu~, and Fish addressed a note to Sickles 
expressing the disapproval of President Grant.l He received 
an immediate reply from Sickles that diplomatic agents had 
been sent to Washington in order to make arrangements for 
the transfer of the ship, and that Polo D'Bernabe was im-
powered to decide upon the details.2 
1Fish to Sickles, December 2, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 668. 
2sickles to Fish, December 3, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 671. 
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From Havana, Hall ·repo·rt.ed rumors that a Spanish 
admiral and several naval o·fficers were refusing to comply 
with the arrangements of the 29th of November,. and that 
the Volunteers were arming themselves and preparing to 
replac·e the Captain-General. JovEfllar had not obtained 
their approval to comply with th.e· recent orders, which he 
h~d received from Spain. 
·The:re we:r.e a.d·d~i.t·ional re-ports. th:~tt· the Virginius. 
~v1Q..u.l-d. be bu.rned if 1·t s·hould actually be transferred to 
Un.i ted St·at·e·s authorities. 3 On t_:he third of December, ninety-
t-·w.o o-f th:e· r·emaining prisoners -we.re·- transfe-rre·d from the 
oi-t-y prison in Santiago to r1,torrow Castl:e., c>.n ·t,he :pretext 
t:hat heal th authori tie$ object·ed ·to t:he crowded conditions. 
Actually, on the same day, the American vessels-of-\var 
Juniata, Vlyo!f!.ing, and Kansas, which h.ad gathered in the 
harbor of Santiago, conducted exerci$es alarming the com-
-
. 
manding tgeneral, who was under t-he ·impression t·-h~t an attack 
was imrni.nent. r-,Growing more fearful, n.e .had ·the. men conveyed 
·to the Spanish warst1ip B,zan which sailed ·for· Ci~enfu.gos. 
F·rom ther·e they would be sent to "9:[avana by rail. When the 
Ship arrived in Cienfugos, it was ordered by the Captain-
\,. General to return to Santiago. On the return voyage the 
ship ran aground at. Zaza 'Where it remained for a day and th.e 
prisoners were transferred to the steamer £iepfugos.4 
Fish to Polo, December 4, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 710. 
··-- 3aall to Davis, December 5, 1~873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 737. 
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On the 8th of December, Fish informed Sickles that 
an agreement had been reached for the surrender of the 
Virginius and the remaining passengers and crew. The ship 
was to be handed over by a Spanish vessel-of-war to a United 
/ States vessel-of-war in the harbor· of Bahia IIonda, Cuba. 
It was t.o take place on the 12th of December between eight 
in the morning and four in the afternoon. The flag of the 
Uniteii States was to ·be flying, yet it was not to be con-
strued that the Virt$inius had the right to fly it at the time 
it w.as ca_.ptu red, for Spain sti_ll ha,d un t:i.1 ·t·he 25t11 of that 
month= to disprove tl1e ships legality. The survivors were 
t:.o ·be transfe.rred to a u·ni ted States vessel-of-war within 
forty-eigr1t hou·rs aft:e:r a sr1ip arrived. This was to take 
place in the day.light 'hours also. The last arrangement was 
that an Americari ship ,vas to be iJ). tn.e harbo·r of Santiago 
on December 25tr1. Tl-1e flag of ·the United· States was to bie 
rais:ed on :a Spanish fort or battery an.d at precisely twelve 
·noon a twenty-one gun salute presente:d~ The Spanish flag 
would be: raised on the American vessel and a like salute 
presen.t·e·d by the ·u,ntted States. This _pr.o:cedu·re would be 
dispensed with·. if Spa.in -should present the a_ppropriate evi-
dence, according to the protoco~ before that date.5 
·' 
------------·--------------·------------·----------------~--------
., 
4Schmitt to Fish, December 4, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 736. 
Hall to Fish, December 13, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 738. 
5Fish to Sickles, December 8, 1873; House Exec. Docs.· 
,4.lst Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 677. 
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At 2 A .M. on December 12th the Virginius was escort-
/ 
ed from Havana Harbor to Bahia Honda by·the Spanish vessel~ 
( 
, 
of-war Isabel la Catolica. About four or five hundred 
people gathered in front of the palace of the Captain-General 
' 
to protest the action. Al though they had no direct knowledge 
·that. th·e ship was to be returned to the United States, they 
strongly suspected the possibili,ty. The Diario de la ?1larina 
·had published reports received .from its l~ew York correspon-
d:ettt to that effect and was particularly inflammatory. 6 
Rear Admiral G.H. Scott, the commander of the United 
States naval forces in tl1e I1orth Atlantic, ordered Captain 
William Whiting of the United States flagship Worchester to 
------
proceed on the 14th, together with the: Un.ited States steam-
.,, 
ship Q.es,patch, to Bahia rionda to receive the V.irgin,i.us,~. 
Whiting was to take a crew from the Pawnee for the Virginius; 
and to place Lieutenant A. Marix in command.. Marix was then 
to take the ship to Tortugas, Fi.orida where Lieut.enant D.C. 
Woodrow of ·t}1e Ossipee wa.s t9 take charge, place the ship 
i.h proper sailing order, ancl t:ak:e l1er~- without stopping at 
any port, to New York.7 
At 10 P.M. on the 14th Whiting left Key West. At 
-·-----------·------------------
Agreement Between Fish and Polo, December 8, 1873; 
House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 712. 
6Hall to Fish, December 13, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 738. 
7scott to Whiting, December 14, 1873; Sen. Exec. Docs. 
54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 10. 
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/ l P.M. on the 15th the two shi~s arrived in Bahia Honda. 
No pilot appeared to guid_e them into the harbor, so Lieu-
tenant Commander Rodgers ran them to an anchorage a short 
:distance from··. the Virginius, ,1hich was lying off Fort 
Difuntos midway in th.e bay. Shortly thereafter a small 
boat was dispatched from a Spanish gunboat about two miles 
further into tl1e. bay, T:he t·oat .reached the Virginius and 
hoisted the A~eri¢an flag as :had been previously specified. 
/ A Spanish naval officer, Commander 1'ianuel de la Camara, 
boarded the iorchester and informed Whiting that he had 
instructions from his government to turn the Virginius over 
to the United States aut:ho,rities. Wrii ting remarked: 
Assured ··by me tha:t· a tim·e most convenient to him woul.d be agreeable to me, the hour of 9 ~.j. was fixed, at 
which time, with th~ .t\mer·ican flag flying at the flag 
staff, Comrnander Manuel de la Camara, of the Spanish 
navy, turned over t·he Virginius to the authorities of 
·tlJe United States, receiving my rece.ipt for her. 
''Whiting irnme·d.i.a,tely sent a C·rew on board to ready the 
.. 
:s}1ip· f.o.r its. ·voy·ag$. to· Florida. T.he Virginiu§_ already con-
tained. about fifty ton.s· of soft coal so her engines and 
):>oilers were started. Th.ey .wer:e ·.fou·nd to. be in poo·r· cond:.l.-
tion, however, and wer.e s}rut a.o·wn, forcing the: s:hi:p t:,o b·e 
t.owe.d. fro·m t.he h.a,rbo.r at abou.t 3 P .M. that day. She· eventu-
:ally got up :.s:team aga.,in and continued under her own power.8 
On the eve·ning. of Oec·embe .. r· 17, 1873, Lieutenant Com-
-'.'.;\ 
l 
mander Daniel Woodrow received the Virgir1.ius in Dry Tortugas, 
8whiting to Scott, December 17, 1873; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th1Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No~ 11. 
47 
i'J 
Florida. He founf! the ship i.n: .. poor repair and. t··h.e crew 
in an entirely exhausted state from their efforts to keep 
the shi_p afloat. Water ,vas leaking from under ·c.e.ment in 
the a.hip~ fore foot and was flooding most of the compart-
' 
.. m.en.ts. The vessel was immediately refueled and proceeded 
north the next -day with the Ossipee, but the water had risen 
,t·wo feet higher overnig_r1t and continued to rise in th,e 
course of tbe voyage. Ce·ment had been used in an attempt 
to plug up t.he hole bu·t it· was to no avail. As they en-
t:er.ea: ·roµgh.e-r seas, sec·tions of t.he hull became loose where 
·i{ was· _p:rev·ious·ly .p9,:tched, and the situation beca,me cri.tical. 
In; tJ1e afternoor1, o.f· ·the 22nd of December the coal was . ; . . . . . . ' . 
shifte:d· aft an(l an. a_n.chor., twenty tons of old iron, ahd 
wir:e r.iggi-ng we·re· thr:ow:n overboard in ar;i. effort t.o $tabiJ .. ·:1 :ze.· . . . 
.. 
t:he s11i.p·.. .I·n the aftern:oon of the 23r·d :Woo.draw repo.rted. 
eigl1t to· t·en f.eet p.f v1ate·r in the f.orward c:ornpa .. rt1n·ent and. 
~nough in· t·he _f.ire rooms to end.a.nger putti.ng out. the f.ires. 
·H:·e. s·ignale-d to the ~ssipee that th.e_y wottld c:hange course 
,south for c·harleston. Several. da.ys. later \t/oodrow ivrote to 
George R··obe-son the Secretary of thE? l~a.vy: 
The· increased. speed enabled me to reduce the water in 
:·her fir.erooms, b.ut I felt no confidence in being able 
··t·o keep it in cheek, as the pumps were constantly break-
ing down and getting choked up, requiring sometimes an 
hou~ or more to repair them. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • On Christmas morning the sea end wind increased and 
the Ossipee ran in under the lee of Cape Fear and an-
, chored, and as the water commenced to gain in fire rooms 
I backed the,Virginius's engines, but owing to want of 
steam I could not turn the engines over fast enough to 
do much good, and the. water gained slowly until -5 a.m. 
on the 26th instant, when the fires ·went out and the 
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• 
donkey pump stopped. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I signaled to tl1e Ossipee to haul us up and take 
us off immediately, as the fore compartment was full 
of water up to a foot of the spar-deck •••• 
At 4.17 p.m., 26th instant, the Virginius sank in 8 fathoms water, her fore cross-trees above water.9 
On the 16th of January 1874, a nav·al ·court of inquiry 
re:p:.c)rt·.ea:: t-hat. the immediate causes of the sinking. were th·e 
:.st:·ress of we·a ther, increa$ed. leaks, giving 011t of. th:e bo·.·iler:s, 
an.o the· ir1.ability to wor.k the pu.rnps. ef.f~ct:ively as.a result 
of t.he f:~.ilt1.re o:f the s.te$.m pov1er\.. The remot.e causes: 
. ' 
,te·.gknesJ:; :·of·· hu·11 ·frorn age: and neglect, fleterioration of. 
· the: ·boilers from the s.ame causes.10 l~o blame was pl._aced 
·up.on. t,·he crew for t·h .. e loss.11 
On December 18th ~1r. Young of t:he. Unite.·d States con ..... 
:s11.::l. .. :ate in Santiago informea Fish that he had been invite:d 
011 board the J1.,1niata by Commander D.S. Braine an.a witnessed, 
-
the transfer of the remaining prisoners. Of the original 
one hundred fifty-five persons on board the Virginius, 
-·----fifteen of the cret¥" and: e.ighty-seven passengers survived.12 
a 
In the .. meantime, h.earings were .. ins ti tu tea by Spain 
in New York Ci.t·y :in :o:r·d'er to gather th:e evidence as stipu-
lated in the protocol of November 14th, to support their 
9woodrow to Robeson, December 30, 1873; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 12. 
lOReport of Naval Court of Inquiry, January 16, 1874; Sen Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 15. 
llFinal Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, Sen. Exec.Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 16. 
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action in seizin·g the Vi rginiu§. Passengers and crew who 
were on the ship, both prior to and at the time of the 
seizure, were subpoenaed to testify. George Bliss, the 
United States attorney for the Southern District of liew 
York, was invited to be present to cross-examine the wit-
nesses but Fish informed Fo:lo. thEi't -tl).is would not be a sub-
sti tutioh for th:eir· :own di·plori1at.ic ·discu.ssions.13 The results 
\vere presented by the': Spani·sh- ambas·:sador to the American 
secretary of s-tate on December 10:th an_d: the:y were accom-
panied by a statement £ram Admiral Pdlo decla~ing that the 
testimony strongly supported Spanish allegations that the 
Yirginius had no right to fly the American flag. 
At the beginn:in-g -of the Ten, Years War, Morales .i.·emus 
b.ad been se11t to. the United State-s: as a·rt agen:t of the in-
-~utrect±on::i.st·s i,n orcier to lobby ·for re·c:,.o_gni tion a-s an in-
a·ep.endent- st:-;1te. Towards t·he en,d: o-f 1869 or b:e·girlni11g of· 
1~870, a :r·ormal tnission was: s·ent to rfe·w York '.:-with Manuel 
Quesad·.a as President and Ado.lp·hus ;De Va:r·o·n·a as Secretary·. 
I·t·s- :obj e:c-t was ·to establi sr1 a :cen,te·r for-· aiding the insur-
rection, bot-:h fina11cially an·d militarily. ·0.f s:ignificance 
was that it :h-ad the authori.ty to purchase sup .. plies and to 
enlist men. T.his Cuban a·unta, as it was called, was the 
strongest o·f a number of, :similar organizations throughout 
N·ew York C·i ty, and it ·succeea_ed in collecting large sums 
of money through contributions and the sale of Cuban war 
__________________ , ______________ _ 
12Young to Scott, December 18, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong~ 2nd Sess. lio._ 739. __ ,_ 
13Fish to Polo, November 24, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 699. 
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bonds. A bo~rd of directors was appointed to control the 
expenditures which went for arms, vessels, a_nd men; and from 
this money was purchased the steamers Florida and Virginius!4 
The four hunared and forty-two ton Virginius had been 
' bul.lt in England and used as a· blockade runner for the Con-
federacy during the American Ci~il War. It was captured 
at Mobile in 1865 and later so·ra to a Mr. Miles Steele by 
the Unite-d :st-ates, government. '.I·n '.filay of 1867 the government 
r~ac-quired the :$.hip in lieu of Steele's debts and on August 
! 
·27, 1870, John F. P-atterson, a resident- of: .. i;ew York, pur-
chased the vessel. for $9,800.15 
Francis Sheppard, a mercl1ant :ma:rt:ne.r :a.nd ·former Co:n .... · 
.federate naval officer, testified. ·t-hat in :·se·pt.e·mber of 1-870 
a J .K. Roberts e-mplcrye·q. hi·rn ·to: ,navig~t.e .· tne v.e.s:sel fro~l 
Washington t·o the New Y·o·rk navy yard. Roberts infortned him 
that th,e ship, had- b.ee{1 purcha·se0 for· several Cub-ans includ-
ing Jose ftiora and Gene·ra.l. Qu.esada, and that tr1ey had furn-
ished money f~or t-he· purcJiase· and repairs. T_he. -s.hip was to 
be used for landing expeclitior.is to aid the tns'urgents in 
Cuba. In N-ew York, Sheppard rnet f1ora ·and ·Quesada who in-
formed him that they were tl:1.e o.wriers,.,·: and requested that he 
stay on as Captai.r1 pecau:se there would be many opport11ni ties 
to rnake mone.y in the capture of Spanish vessels and cargoes •. 
14:eolo to Fish, December 10, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713. 
· Nevins, 179-180. 
15Polo to Fish, Decemp~r 10, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713, pp. 1001-1002. 
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Varona stated to him that $15,000 and Cuban war bonds had 
been allocated from insurrectionary funds for the VirginiuJ..6 
The Virginius left New York on October 4, 187~ from 
Knickerbockers Ice Co. ~,harf on th.e north river. When she 
was just off of Sandy Hook she to;o.k: on board Quesada., Varona 
~ ---and other Cubans who overtook her by means of a lighter ship, 
the Virginia Seymour. I11 addition, boxes c·onta.ining ammuni-
tion, revolvers, military trumpets, and flags were loaded 
a.board. In the vicinity of the island of Curacao., off Ven-
ezuela, an ad<ii tional cargo of arms and munitions was trans-
ferred from the schooner Bil~Y. Butts und·e.r Quesada' s direc-
tion. rrhis included five hundreci cases of $h·ot, shell and 
.ammunition; eleven ,hu·ndred cases of arms; two or three 
clozen boxes of ,.leather goo.ds.; six carriages for guns; and 
• four brass h.owi·t,zer:s •.. F.tom there they proceeded to Puerto 
Cabello on: the Ve.ne.zu·elan -ma:.i.nland • . '. . . . 
.. . 
Sh·eppard stated ··that· as Captain he discussed the char-
acter of the s.hi:P w±t:h the. Url'·ited States. c:o.nsuls at Curac~ .. o, 
Laguayra, .. and Puerto· C·abello arid .. re:c$.ived: the impression 
that they were not i[:s.nora.nt of her a:ct.ivi.ti·es ·but vrere sat-
isfied as long as the certified .papers from the New· York 
Collector of Customs were presented. 
In Puerto Cabello tr1e arms and mun.iti:eJn:_$ · were unlo·aded 
l!'i •· ,, 
:at a nearby fort. From there the ship was ·used to transport 
Venezuelan troops along the coast an~ to aid Guzman Blanco, 
16Polo to Fish, Dec anber 10, 1873; 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713, Inclosure: 
Francis Sheppard. 
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t~e dictator, who was currently suppressing a revoluti6n 
in his own country. Blanco, in return, was to aid the 
Cuban revolution.17 
Further testimony reve.a.led that botp subseq_uent 
captains and their crews had always believed that the 
Gubans and not Patterson \vere the true owners of the ship, 
and that on board were one American and six Cuban flags. 
Captain C··ha;:rl.es Smith. stated that l1e had been offered a 
comrnissi·on 1·n the. Cub.c"in navy by Quesada and that ther:e were 
arms on board enough for every man.18 Edward Greeni,ood, the 
first ~ngineer.,. ·reca.ll:e.-d_ ·h_i.s response wh,ert the ship was 
board-ed just out of Ne,1 York: '-':_'r.his. lo·oks very suspicious, 
these men com:i.nJ!-: on board, each with a revolver hung on him, 
I ain't acc~sto·me:d to going to sea in this way." He further 
remarked that whe:r1: they reached Cura.c&o and powder, shell, 
and ammunition were taker1 on- ·board from the Billy Butts, 
the ships company demanded to ·know ~hat was in it for them. 
Quesada answered them s.aying that ·they would each receive 
. . 
one hundred fifty d.o·llare, ~a.oh time. t·hey ran. th-e Cuban 
b:iockade.19 
The testimo_ny i:tEtelf', tl1ough tne·:re were indications 
of landings of small amounts of arms on the Cuban coast, 
l 7Polo to Fish, December 10, 1873.; House Exec. Docs. 
----------4ls~ Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713. 
18Polo to Fish, December 10, 1873; [ouse Exec. Docs • 
. 4lst Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713, pp. 1020-1028. 
19Polo to Fish, December 10, 1873; !louse Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713, pp. 1028-1034. 
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did not emphasize the activiti.es of the Virginius in 
-directly aiding the insurrection. The Spanish objective 
in conducting the hearings was to prove the illegality of 
the ship's registry,and to establish the fact that the 
owners of tl1e Virginius never intended for it to conform. 
to its status as an American vessel. 
It was pointed out by Polo that the laws of the 
United States were strict as to the national character of 
vessels. Before a ship can be registered ·"the husband, or 
acting and managing O\vner, to.get her wi.th t.he master. thereof, 
and one or more sureties•·• mu.st be bound for the sum of 
$2,000 if the s:hip i-s over thre.e· hundred tons. If at any 
time tr1e vesse·-1 should p.a.ss !nto foreign ha.nds, t'he regis-
tra-tion ce•rti--ficate mu.st be delivered to United States 
au:thori tie~. wit,.hin ei_gnt· d.e~y.s after the- individual in charge 
reaches the United Stat.es. Only Pa.t-ters·on and Capta.in 
Sheppard actually s-ign·ed th~ bond and ·no .sureties were ob-
tained. Polo argued. that this was done deliberately beca.use 
Patterson;·~knew that the vessel would pa.es to foreigners 1 
without the certificate being turned in. The sum of the bond 
would thereby be forfeited?O Furthermore, no registration 
number was assigned to the Virg_inius until February 21, 1872. 
At the time that it was assigned, it was not by the required 
application to a collector of customs. By law, a vessel 
ceases to be of the United States if she ceases to have a 
20Polo to Fish, December 10, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 713, p. 977. 
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proper· registration number._21 
The documents which Spain had gathered revealed the 
.-
questionable nature of the Virginius' registry. It was 
obvious that Patterson was a front to obtain credentials 
sufficient to allow the ship to leave New York harbor and 
to clear her as an American vessel in Caribbean ports. 
Wl1en Fish. received the paper-s. he immediately re(IUest-
~rl a legal opinion fr6m George H. Williams, the Attorney-
General of the United States. Williams replied that pursuant. 
to section one 0£ the act of December 31, 1792,all ships 
must be regist-ered. Section four Qf the same law stated 
that in order for an American to obtai.n a registry, he ttlU$t= 
disassocia.te himself from any foreign power. Therefore·, 
qf:ficially, the Virgigius was not an American ship. The·: 
ve·ssel was registered in a false .name and fd.r a.11 purposes 
belonged to the -Cuban insurgents. Williams, however., ad-
amantly asserted ·that the Y!rgigius was exempt £rom inter-
ference. She was flying the American ~lag and Spain did 
not ha.ve tl:ie right to determine t.he lega.li ty of a United 
States Vessel's registry.22 
On Decemb·er 17, 1873, acting upon ih·st.ructions from 
::ere·sident Grant, Fish ordered Secretary of the Navy Robeson 
to dispense with the salute to the flag.23 On the 18th of 
------------------------------·-
21Polo to Fish, December 10, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd_ Sess. No. 713, p. 998. 
22Williams to Fish, December 17, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 750. 
23Fish to Robeson, December 17,· 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 751. 
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' Decembe~ Consul Hall transmitted an official communication, 
from Rear Admiral Scott in Key West to the c6mmander of the 
United States naval forces in Santiago, that the salute would 
not take place.24 Fish th~n informed Polo that the docu-
ments which he had recei·ved made it appear that the Virgin.-
ius was not enti t-led to carry the American flag and that he 
had informed the naval authorities, on orders from the Pres-
_ident of the United States, to dispense with the salute. 
\ 
i 
T-h.e United States would make an inquiry of its own and 
ad::opt le<gal proceedi11gs against the Vir~inius ·and any person, 
enould. it be found that they ha,d v·iolated ~_ny la,1.25 Williams 
in.structed tl1e United States attorney in J~ew York to prepare 
:t.he papers to prosecute the Virginius.26 
,. On December 6th Dan Sickles offered his resignat:ion to 
s·.ecr$tary Fish, on the basis t.hat reports had been published 
that the government ·disapproved of his conduct in the Vir.~in-
ius case.. Fish i:n.d-icated that there -was no official disap-
proval, and that it w~s inappropriate for him to leave at 
t.hat tfme, because the terms of t.he protocol had yet to be 
c·ompletely ca.rri ed out. As so on as the A ttorney-Gener::il 's 
report was received by Fisl1, Sickles resubmitted his resig-
nation. On December 20th it was accepted. lie left because 
24nall to Davis, December 20, 1873; Bouse Exec. Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 740. 
25Fish to Polo, December 22, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 714. 
26williams to Fish, December 23, 1873; House Exec.Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 753 • 
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o·f his own disappointment in t.h-e outcome of the affair 
rather than by reason of public or official pressure. 27 
The Uniten States had responded appropriately to the 
evidence produced by the hearings, and in the manner in 
which the protocol had specified. Under the provisions of 
the agreement, Spain had the right to demand reparation for 
'the damage inflicted by the Virginius in the course of her 
aid to the Cuban insurrection. On December 30,- 1873, 
.Hamil ton Fish recei.ved a communication from Polo D' Bernabe 
asking for a consideratio,n of the Spanish claim~ It was 
.. _, 
stetted as the basis for their request, tha.t ,v-hen the Vir-
ginius left New York harbor it had false papers of registry, 
crew list, and manifest and that the expedition was otherwi-se 
illegal because of the _p_ir-ati.c·al ,nature of its mission. 2B 
A week later Fish re·plied. There had been no o.bj·ection 
to. ··the ship's papers at t11e time tl1at it departed :from Iiew 
Y·or,k and, even if it ha,d, it would only have constit.uted a 
.muni.cipal offense. The punishment wo.l1ld be .determined by 
local law and there would have been no question involving 
a foreign nation. Fish, therefore, drew a distinction 
27s1ckles to Fish, December 6, 1873; House Exec. Docs. 
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 753. 
Fish to Sickles, December 6, 1873; H.ouse Exec. Docs. 
-41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 675. 
Sickles to Fish, December 20, 1873; House Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 682. 
Fish to Sickles, December 20, 1873; Bouse Exec. 
Docs. 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 684. 
28Polo to Fish, December 30, 1873; ··=·"_Sen~: Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 18. 
· 57 
between what was stipula-ted in the protocol of 1iovember 
29th and the right of. __ a f·oreign nation to interfere in the 
internal affairs of -.a.nether country. Ife also stated that 
:t_h_e vessel was boup:d for Curacao,,a neutral port, and that 
:found on board was only a small qua.nti ty of arms and am-
·munition, and only· a few individuals implicated in the 
-r:evolution. This, r1e believed, was not sufficient evidence 
·to :ind.i.cat·e that the ship was intended to ·be- used in a. 
mili t~ry expedition t:o Cuba. Furtherrnore, t·he United States 
could not be-held responsible for the acts of private in-, 
dividua.ls. Should tt1er.e. have been. some ·ju.stifica.tion for 
believing they were engaged i·n i.lll;lgal a.ctiv-ities, the arms 
might have :been confiscated, but certa_i'nly there could. be 
no recourse against the United Sta.t.e:s government. Finally, 
no parallels could be drawn between the adjudication of the 
Ala barn~ and. the Vi rginius claims. The Virgin~.us was not an 
armed man-of-war v1hich l1ad been known to seize merchant 
s-hips and Spain.' had not: even a.dmi tted that a state of w.ar 
e~isted in Cuba.29 
Polo was not ple:ttsed. wi~-h ]'isr1 's comments. He re.plied 
that the intent of· t:,h,e vo_yage wa.s to land military expedi-
" 
tions upon c·uba and to aid th.e hostilities against Spain. 
The fact that the .ship' s papers were proven false was evi- . 
dence of the illic·i t nature· .o:f her miss·ion, and it was 
c.ert:_a·in that she, did not conf:orm. t·o th.e traditional concept 
of a commercial vessel. That a false registry afforded 
29Fish to Polo, January 9, 1874; Sen. Exec.Docs. 
54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 19. 
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protec·tion for many months against Spanish cruisers was 
confirmed by Captain Sheppard, and the Attorney-General 
of the United States had verified tt1at this wa,s in viola-
ti·on of United States navigational statutes. Polo declared. 
that it was an act of piracy to attack the commerce of 
Spain by obtaini~g a false registry.30 
Fish res.pond.e·d that the Virginius' papers .. we:re entire-
ly regular anq that they lacked only one surety, a situation 
tl1at had happene·d a nµmber of times· before. Her cargo was 
not unusual for a ·commerc·ial. ves·Se·l and the ship actually 
·went· to Cu·rac.ao ·1\1'h.ich \vas he·r .lis.ted destination. Further-- . . ' . . . . ,_ .. 
more, the .s·pani<sh ·offic·e.r aboa·rd t·he Tornado had no know-
ledge of what. c·o:r1sti·tl1ted. p·ir.acy according to internationt;l 
law. 
Fo:l:tJ otf·ere·d.: su{)·stan'.tiat'ic}fi. of ·the Spanish claim by· 
quoting a. j·u·d.ge. o.f ·the Untt.·e:cf Sta.tes. Supreme Court: 
When a person forms the gui.lty intention of carrying on ' 
. 
a military expedition or enterprise from the United States against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, di stri:ct, or people 
wi tl1 ,vhom the ·united Stat es are at pea·ce, and shall pro-
vide or prepare the meaner to: cio so, his c1~ime is complete,1 
'The decision could not b~ found by the State Department in 
·an.Y book of decisions or judicial authority, and Fish com-
·.P·i .. eted his own remarks on the matter by entirely rejecting 
any reclamation of Spain. The issue was rtot raised again and 
-------------------·-------------
30Polo to Fish, February 2, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 20. 
31Polo to Fish, February 2, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 20, p. 30. 
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Spain made no ·effort to submit it to arbitration as was 
allowed under the provisions of the protoco1.32 
The evidence which Spain had presented to justify 
th·e· :c·a·pture of the Y,irginius. had been convincing. The 
ship• s owners ,vere agents of the Cuban insurrection and the 
vessel was never intended for legitimate commercial oper-
:ations. She was, however, officially entitled· to fly the 
f'lag of th.e. United· States, because the certificate of reg-
istration had been granted, however improperly, by the cus-
~·om.s· h.01rse in New York. This was tr1e nor·mal proced.ure. 
:Cone.ideri.ng the circumstances, t·h.ougl1., there was a degree . ' 
. ' . . ' 
. of justificatio.ri ,.vh .. ich. could· not. be .den_ied. .. B.o:th President 
Grant and Secret.ary Fis11 were a,vare of this an:d .accordingly 
dispensed witl1 the salute: to ·the flag. If they were·. to· 
have a.llowe·d the Spanish re·c.la.mation, howevE:?r, t·hey wou.ld 
h.av.e dis.claimed the right o.f an Am.erican ves.sel to thEe .Pro-
tec_:t.ioit ,11/h.i.c.h it was ent.itl·e.d un.d.er· tha·t flag. In s··pite 
.of Polo's argurner1ts t·o the contrary, Spa,.in. ~ccepted: this 
d·ecision with little disagreement. 
32Fish to Polo, April 18., 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 
54th Cong. 1st Sess. Doc. 165, No. 21. 
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Chapter IV 
Aftermath 
The official American attitude in respect to the 
Virginius controversy rested primarily upon a legal tech-
nicality: that a ship is entitled to the protection of 
the nation under whose flag she sails, and that the right 
of that vessel to freely traverse the seas without inter-
ference is inviolable. Spain accepted .the decision of 
--- ·--·-··-~ 
the United States to deny its claim for damages on that 
premise. The United States now presented the same prin-
ciple as justification, under the terms of the protocol, 
for its own reclamation on behalf' of the families· of the 
passengers and crew of the Virginius who had been executed. 
Furthermore, in the protocol of November 29, 1873, Spain 
had agreed to prosecute any party found guilty of violat-
ing a Spanish law. It was the opinion of the American State 
Department that General Juan Burriel, the Governor of the 
Eastern Department of the island of Cuba, had been guilty 
of disregard_ing the integrity of an American ship on the 
high seas, under international principles of law, and of 
the direct infraction of Spanish statute and decree. 
On November 20, 1874, Secretary Fish informed President 
Grant that Great Britain had presented Spain with a claim 
for damages, as the result of the execution of nineteen of 
her citizens found aboard the Yirginius at the time of its 
capture. The United States had requested that Gr·eat Britain 
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delay their claim,in order to prevent the establishment 
of a preced.ent which might prove detrimental to the Amer-
ican position. The State· Department had issued repeated 
requests for Spanish consideration of their own claim but 
no positiv·e response was received.l Great Britain refused 
to wait longer and requested an· indernni ty of thirty-three 
J?.Ounds fo.r eac:h of t·he nine Negroes and. five t1undred pounds 
:f.o·r eacf-1 of· tl1e te.n_ wh.ite me.n, all Britis.h citizens, wli.o 
had died. Spain imme-d:ia~t:ely acceded to thi~: dE3mand :6.n 
t~he condition that any sum not claimed by t'.he famil·y ·of a 
. 2 .·. : . . deceased person woul.d. be r-eturned. Sho:rtl_y: ther.eafter, 
Fish instruct:ed C_al.e·b Cus·h.ing, tl1.e ·new :American ambassador 
to Spain., and, a _far more cautious man than Sickles, to de-
# 
mand no less a: sum than that paid to Great Britain for each 
_pa.ss eng.er .an-d crewman and a :larger· amount for the capt-fl.in, 
mate, pµ-r.-suer, and sJ::1ip's do,.ctor. An indemnity was also 
'r.~·qtrf3sted to compens.a·te t:hose who had be:en detained and 
i.m·pr.i sQried. tl1ough not. -actu.al,l:;y executed. 3 
(Ju·sh.in_g replied that Spanish officials :had: informed 
h:Lm ·that tbey h:ad delayed on:t..y becfiuse the·y· required cer-
t·ain admissions on the pa:rt of the United States on contro-
versial points, and because the investigation into the 
lcushin.g to Fish, December 5, 187 4; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 46. 
2Fish to Grant, November 20, 1874; -Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 35. 
3Fish to Cushing, November 28, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 39. 
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conduct of the Cuban authorities had y~t to b.e made. 4 
' Cushing felt that the new Spanish Minister: of State, Au~·: 
gusto Ulloa, had responded in a conci.liato·ry tone and that 
an agreement could shortly be reac·hed. Ulloa wrote to 
Cushing: 
The Spanis:h g-ov·ernment, anxious to succ:eed, b.y 
all legitimate and decorous means, in putting an end 
to sucl1 vexatious differences, will, for its part, not 
·s .. hrink from making those concessions and renunciations· 
which do not imply abdication of the sovereignty and 
:tnd ependence of the. nation, or which" might be construed 
as an abandon~ent of the national dignity, provided that 
th¢ Government of the United States, nobly co-operating 
to the same end, is disposed to make equal concessions 
under ·11ke reservations.5 
:.Speei·f·ically, Ull:oa argued that it was th.e. c·o·ntention 
of·· the gove.rnme.nt. of t11-e Un-it-ed States that no power could 
.$ea:rc11 or det,ain a. vessel in neutral water.s in time of peace 
·i.f it were carrying_ th·e· Ame:r·ican flag.. Ile indicated that 
t·hi s princ,iple o--f international law was· ,1is-$ly developed, 
but that in n:o way· c·o,u:ld it be construed to be absolute. 
Tl1e United Stat-~s. :itself had v:i.o.lated ·t.he principle in 
attempting to restrict the f'lo1·1t :of -slaves to the American 
Sou.th for .Jnany years. The rig.ht to in:q_uire into the na-
··ti.onI:tli ty of a ship and to bo.ard i.t in ce:r·ta:i.n cases had 
always been cor1sidered as a means, often the only one, of 
4cushing to Fish, December 4, 1874; Sen. Exec~ocs. 
54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 42. 
5cushing to Fish, December 5, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 
54th Cong. 1st Sess. l~o. 46, Inclosure: Ulloa to Cushing, 
December 3, 1874, p. 108. 
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exercising maritime police and of guaranteeing the security 
of commerce between nations. 
This right. to search was certainly not to be exer-
c::i,.sed arbitrarily, for according to Ulloa: - .. · 
,It is not to be deduced herefrom that, a.t any time, 
and :!ot:~- 11.ll- :~motives whatsoever, the right of visit 
shoul·d~";it:6·e: pJrmitt:ea_· -as may suit the arbitrariness or 
the ,c-orive·1;ience of· the war marine: but neither d.oes it 
appear rational to exclude it decisively and absolutely 
under all circumstances, except du.ring. a state of war 
and between belligerents recognized as. such. 
None·theless, if this right was restricted unconditi,onally 
it- c,ould conceivably: an-nu.I tn:e equally as importan:t. right 
-of self-defense. 6. 
There could be n.o· quettt:,i,on as to ·the ch:ar'a:cter of 
t'he Virginius. Ther$f6r-e, in this part:icu1ar c·ase, the 
.:circumstances were present in wh:.ich international la,v coul'd' 
legally be viol·ated. The ::s.hip .had been in t·he service <J·:f· 
the Republic o.f Venezuela and later of the Cuban insur:rec-
tion. She had car.ried m:en, arms, horses and muni tio:n.s to: 
be used against the l.~gal authority on: the island o.f Cubt~.-•. 
The: ship, on ft·s- intended missio.n to aid the rebellion, :ha:d 
been cI-1eered as it left lJew York, ·with a qqe:stionable.regi-
stration. Wh·en i_t \vas ultimately sigl1ted by the Tornado, 
it suddenly changed course and threw its cargo overboard, 
thus acting in a way leaving little doubt as to its true 
character. Ulloa remarked: 
6cusl1ing to Fish, December 5, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs •. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 46, Inclosure: Ulloa to Cushing, 
December 3, 1874, p. 108. 
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There was no question, therefore, of a simply suspected 
vessel, the search of which might have presented more 
or less probabilities -respecting l1er ownership and tl'1e 
inoffensiveness of her intentions. There was no possi-
bility of an error which might have resulted in the in-
conveniences and the unwarranted prejudices of an inutile 
detention. It was a foregone conclusion, and the result 
proved it.7 
Lastly, a question .had :arisen whether the Virgini~s 
·had bee.n en.gag:e_d_- in_. piracy-.. Spa.t·n had objected to the 
Americain r·e,a:ction to t_he Span.ish te·r.mi-nolo.gy and the Mini-s~ 
ter of State declared. tha·t. 1:ega.l precedent.s. established 
, that the m:ere act. of· 0 p:ila,_a·ge and .plunde._r" c:o-nsti.tut-e-d pi-
racy. He wits wil-1 ing to conc:t3'd:e ·t·ha.t. more r.ecetit int·:erpre-
tati ons had been le:ss sev.ere._, but tha·t $.·t. __ bes:t pir.·acy could 
,be proven s:oiely on. tJ1;e ba::,is that- t·he. offic-ers:. and cre·w of 
a ship be :found guilty of destroying t-he s'hippi-ng· o:f :a 
foreign nation in tin1e of ]Yeace._: T-hi.s w-as: mo-s·t -·9Efrtal.n1-y 
true of the V.irginius,. 8 
Ultimately, Spain was foro.~d to· :·con-cedf:; t·:nat_ the ex-
e·cu-t:Ions were improper, and th-at· they woul:d be willing to .-_ 
o·_ffer •c,q:mp~nsation or1 tho:se grounds: 
The terrible consequences whicl1 the rasl1 and crim-
inal expedition of" the Virginius has had for some of the 
unhappy perso:ns wt10 were on board • • • could not do 
less than move the generous sentiments of the Spanish 
government, so painfully situated between the strict 
7Cushing to Fish, December 5, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 46, Inclosure: Ulloa to Cushing, December 3, 1874, p. 109. 
8cushing to Fish, December 5, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54tb Cong. l~t Sess. No. 46, Inclosure: · Ulloa to Cushing, • i. 1 · •• •. -.,< J.} . .,. ; . 
. December 3, 1874, p. 111. 
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ful.fi.llment of the laJv1s of special circumstances, and 
the impulses of humanity and of commiseration common 
to all honorabl_e men, but which should be violently 
stifled before the imperious voice of duty and defense 
of the high int.erests confided to the public powers. 
That duty fulfilled, senti'ments of l1umani ty may 
still recover all their force and endeavor to seek, 
not a remedy for ~n irreparable punishment, but allevi-
ation and consolation for those persons who, ,1i thout 
having had. part in the commission of the crime, parti-
·cipate fatally in the terrible coris·equences of tlie· 
ex:piation im.posed by law. 9 
Spain_ ·wa.s willing t·o off er an ··tnde.rnn_f.ty :s.i··m-ilat to 
that given G:re-a·t Bri t·ain and on. t .. he :.same :c.onditions. Should 
that no:t 'b·e ·sa.ti sfa-ctory, the q11est-ior1: could b:e: submitted 
to imp·artia·1. arb.i·tration under the proto·c·ol:. On. the- 30t,h 
o·:e De·cember, ·r'ish re:plied that though he ·was n.o··t. ln agree-
:m.·ent w:ith Illloa'_s. ar.·guments he was pleas~d with the t•tone" 
a.rid· ·-"-ternperu :of the minister's correspondence.10 
, 0.n. February 16, 1875, Cusl1ing informed tl1e Secretary 
'Cif St,a:te that a prel.iminary agreement had been r'e:a_ched. An 
unco.ndit:iorial ind.emnity allowance wou·ld be offered by Spain. 
Di:st·r-ib.u.tio.n itas to be· made at the discret.io·n of the United 
·$:tat·es .and no return of unused fu.nds was req_t1ired, as had 
been the case in tJre British settlement. In return, Cush-
ing must admit the illegality of the actions of the Virginiustl 
9Cushing to Fi~h, December 5, 1874; Sen. Exec. Docs. 
---------54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 46, Inclosure: Ulloa to Cust1ing, December 3, 1874, p. 111. 
10Fish to Cushing, December 30, 1874; Sen Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 47. 
llcushing to Fish, February 16,. 1875; .. Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Conig. 1st Sess. No. 50. 
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On March 2nd an off::Lcial document was drawn and short-
l __ y :agreed upon. The sum of $80,000 was to be delivered to 
·the United States for the purpose of relief to the families 
bf. those executed. This amount would be in total settlement 
:o.:t -any demand for pecuniary recprnpense. The President of 
·tn.e United States would: have tl1e ·authority to dist:ribu.te. 
·t.he: money as he sa.w fit -wt_thout providing an accou·nt of ·t·he 
·.ap_port-ionment -~ lio cornment. was m~de concerning·, t-he ·1?gali ty 
o,f t11·e ·capture or an admissi.ctn o.:f: :res,pons;i.l)i_l.-ity ma-de b.y-
.e:i t"11er party .12 
President: Grant: subsequently declared that f··or t·he 
·:rnon:ey to be :assi:gned, the person on whose behalf the·- sum 
wa.s. paid must hav~, ·been a C:itiz.en of t-h.e u·nited States; 
:13:r.i tish subject.s ·had been reimbursed u·nder their own agree-
ment. A cert.ifioate o·f ·na·tur·alizat·ion_· ·wa.s reauired for an 
..i. 
American not born .i.n the Un:ited $t-ate.s·-, and any sums remain-
ing unclaimed woul-d be d.ivid·ed amcJng· those ivho had previou-s-
ly received reimbur-s·ement for th-ei.:r· loss. In effect, the ,,:~11. 
ques:tion o.f th·e indemnit.y was closed • 1 3 . . ,. 
The .rer4aining issue in the Virginius controversy was 
punishment for the part_y di·rectly responsible for the exe-
.cution of the American cit.izens, General Juan Burriel. In 
April 187 4, in a letter to t·he ed:;itor of La Revue des deux 
1"1ondes, Burriel attempted to justify his actions by refer-
ing to Spanish law. Ile cited a decree issued by Captain-
12Cushing to Fish, March 2, 1875; Sen. Exec. Docs. 54th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 54. 
13Report on Indemnity Payment, February 10, 1887; 
Sen. Exec. Docs. 49tl1 Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 82. 
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General Domingo Dulce ·on March 24, 1869, which specified 
that all insurgent leaders should be shot with no condition 
otl1er· th~p to establish their identity. Burrie.l contended 
th:at as general arid p·rovinc:ial governor, he was impo\vered 
·to order ~hese ex.~·cut:·i.o·ns and that he had, in fact_, gone 
·.:" . 1 ' 
. . ·~ 
. 
. beyond· the 1-aw .1Jy al.lowing several days before tl1ey to.ok . ' ' ' 
' 
. 
place. .He-:' a·lso: arg;ued tn>at the telegraph lines :and sub-
marine cable between the- Captain-General in ·uavana and San-
tiago de Cuba had b$er1 int'errupted on seve:ral occasions. 
Due t.o the state o.f insu·rre·.ction on the island, the lines 
=rraq b:een out from l'ioVernbe:r 1st to l~ovember 7·th,_ .and from· 
No-vember 13-th t·o t·he pres:ent time, tr1us preventi11g any com-
tnunic-at.:ion from 1Jladrid t-o Santiago by way: o:f :Havana.: Pres-
.ident Cast·elar did not r-e:ceive news o·f the caJJtu.te -u:ntil 
the 7th of November at w.t1:ich time it ¥ras t:o-o la·t~ to :stop 
t.he executions~ :Furthermore, 1;3tirriel :c:lairned t·.h·at. the 
C-apta-in ,of the Virginius, Joseph ··F_ry, ·:had adm·±tted the in-
.t-:~nti.ons ,o,·f the ship and thereby prove<i the appropr-i·ateness 
o.f ·h·is actions.14 
Earlier, Dan S.i·c1r:J.es- :h.ad r-e·port.ed. t,o· Washington that 
:tl1e Spanish' gov.ernment ·had. revo.:ked t-he authori.ty of subor-
dinate generals to execute p~isoners, and that General Prim, 
Mr. Becerra, tl-1e Minister of the Colonies, and Mr. Moret, 
Becerra's successor, had condemned the practice. Moret 
. 14Adee to Fish, April 25, 1874; House Exec. Docs. 44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 33, Inclosure:Letter from Burriel 
to the Editor of La Revue des Deux Mendes. 
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·bad <.t:irect·e·d punishment for any officer found guilty of 
this activity.15 Several months later, in response to Sec-
retary Fish's request for clarification of this point, :_: 
Cushing stated that· General Caballero de Rodas had institut-
ed. a decree on: June 7, 1869, annulling Dulce's order of i1arch 
2:4 of the same year, but allowing, in the sixti1 article of 
the new act, the seizure of neutral vessel-s. Upon the 
protest of the United s··tates, a third act was invoked on, 
Ju~e 18, 1869, elimin.at:i.ng the si)tth article. It seerned 
reasonably certain that·: Bu.rriel h-ad no legal justificati.on 
for his actions.16 
In respect to t11e b'l"'~·ak ·in co:mmttn~oations, !Vlr. Adee 
of the United States Le.g~tion in :_g:pa.fn ·rem~rked that Madrid 
h-ad received news of t.h:e capture on: 'the 6t:h of .1{ovember and 
·orders could- well h-a.v·-e 'b$en tele.grarnme.d l:>E3t,v-een I~ovemb,e_r 
8t,h an·d -~Jr.e :-13th, ·when cornmunicatiorrs -vrer.e: tem,po:tar.il.y re-
st,ore.q. The maj·ortty of th.e ex.ecutions did not occur until 
t'he :12t-h ·and could: c·ertain.ly· have b:een ·pre:vented by then.17 
F~isl} fe·l t that rega.rdless of ·ot·h·.er fs3,¢tors, tl1ere sJ1ould 
-J1ave been -ari .atti·tude· <Jf re-spec,t for an America.,n ves·se.1 
under the t·r·ea.ty of 1795, and. he ·d·em·anded to kn.ow :wl1~n t.l:ie'. 
proceedings" against Burriel would ·begin. 18 
l5sickles to Fish, January 31, 1874; House Exec. Docs. 43rd Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 688. 
16cushing to Fish, June 27, 1874; I-louse Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st S~ss. No. 35. 
l 7Aa.~e to Fish, June 27, 1874; Bouse Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 33. 
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For the next three and one half years Fish continued 
to press Cushing for information from the Spanish government 
concerning Burriel. A satis'factory reply v1as never receivea:1J 
Fish was informed that- shortly after tl1e incident Burriel 
~ had been relieved from command of Oriente province and re-
tired to private life. T11e· United States did not feel that 
triis was s·atisfactory punishm·errt and continued their protests. 
It also came to the attent,i,on. of the State Department that 
Burri el h.ad ,be·en promoted to Mariscal de Campo, a rank 
• 
. eq~iva.lent to. major general. Spanish officials stated that 
:he· had been promoted: because of a .lack· o·f qualified officers, 
and because of the -n.ecessi tie-s of i-va..r in Cuba· and on the 
v 
pe11insula, about which tne UrJite:d :·S.t~ttes had :no right to 
interfere.20 
In October .of· 187-5, Cushing reported that an investi-
gation had finally begun and that the Supreme Council of War 
18Fish to Cushing, June 9, 1874; House Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 34. 
19Fish to Cushing, June 9, 1874; Bouse Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 34. 
Cushing to Fish, July 22, 1874; House Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. N·o. 38, Incloeure: Cushi~ng to Ulloa. 
Cushing to Fish, November 16, 1875; House Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. lfo. 63. 
Fisl1 to Cushing, January 6, 18.76; House Exec. Docs. 
44th ·Cong. 1st Sess. No. 64. 
20Cushing to Fish, July 22, 1874; House Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 38, Inclosure: Cushing to Ulloa. 
Cushing to Fish, August 23, 1875; House ~xec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 52. 
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r1ad declared itself fit to try t:he case. The accused's 
rank was to l1ave ·no bearing on the outcome2land Burri el, 
who was then in command of loyalist forces against insur-
g$nts in Vi zcay:a, Spain, was replaced i:r1 the fie.ld. The . . -
only excuse for continued delay was that :proceedings against 
the- assasins of General Pri_m and the attempted assasins of. 
KiJ1g Amadeo. ,Al.ere pre-sen·tly :be·.ing h.eld ~- arid that Burri el' s 
trial could not begin until theit tonclusion. The trial 
was never held, fo·r Cus·hing i·nfo:rmed the State Department 
ttiat Juan Burriel died of' nEttu-ral causes: in D.ecember of 
1877. 22 
The cons.ide:·r,ation wlri.ch had ·p:revented._ t:·h·e i.mme.diate 
sati sf act ion o·f· the American ·d.emands· fo.r ·an indemnity payment 
and a prope·r trial for General Bur·r_iel was Spa11ish: pride. 
The government 01f Spain, ev·en in- terms of -the s.·ociety in 
which it -funct __ ioned, could not condone such c.ruelt:y as· had 
occurred in the port of Santiago. It was obvious from 
'~ 
Cusl1ing to Fish, Aug;ust 25, 1875; House Exec. Docs. 
44th Cong. 1st Sess. No. 53, Inclosure: Castro to Cushing. 
2lcushing_to Fish, October 20, 1875; House Exec. Docs. 
44th Corig. 1st Sess. No. 61, Inclosure: Conde de Casa-Val-
encia to.Cushing. 
45th 
45th 
Cushing to Fish, 
Cong. 2nd ~ess. N9. 
April 21, 1876; House Exec. Docs. 
5. 
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22cushing to Fish, 
Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 
February 5, 1876; House Exec. Doc~. 
4. 
Cushing to Fish, April 21, 1876; House Exec. Docs. 45th Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 5. 
Fish to Cushing, >lay 17, 1876; House Exec. Docs. 
45th Cong. 2nd Sess. No. 6. 
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Ulloa's arguments that his government was willing, if not 
anxious, to settle the affair, were it not for fear of com-
promising tr1e dig11i ty of the nation, shoul(l they accede un-
conditionally to the American demands. Ulloa was aware 
that ultimately a concession ,-vould have to be made by his 
government for perrni t ting such an injustice. However, it 
was only after the Minister of State had formally presented 
an explanation of their positionj being that Spain owed a 
moral duty to h.umanity rather tr1an a legal obligation to 
the United States, that the indemnity was allowed. 
In respect to Burriel, it can only be surmised what 
migr1t l1ave happened 11.ad his death not occurred until a later 
date. The extent of time between the first American demand 
for his punishment and the actual date of his death would 
seem to indicate that a proper trial would never have taken 
place. If it had, the verd~ict would undoubtedly have been 
in l1i s favor. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the case of the Virginius, it was evident that 
the contending parties, both Spain and the United States, 
acted with little knowledge of contemporary events in Cuba. 
Considering the nature of· the allegatio11s, it ,,1as not un-
. likely that a distortion of the details of the incident 
could 11ave led to a more serious cor1frontation. The Amer-
ican ·position \vas f-ormulated on the basis of scattered 
reports from its diplomatic agents, prior to the time that 
the State Department received the supporting documents from 
the Spanish Ambassador, and Spai:rt repeatedly dela,yed its 
reply to American demands on the premise that it lacked 
proper information on the incident. An overzealous American 
~inister and a level of emotionalism in both nations which, 
though in no \vay comparable to th_e feelings tl1at errupted 
a quarter century later between Spain and the United States, 
could. not 11ave contributed in a positive way towards a sat-
. isfactory solution to the crisis which developed • the 1n 
closing months of 1873. Furthermore, the-natuYe 
precipitating events themselves, particularly the barbarous 
fashion in which they -were executed, was enough to strain 
diplomatic relations to the limit. In this respect, it was 
certainly surprising that the affair should have come to 
such a peaceful conclusion. Ultimately, the crisis abated 
of the ~-~-· 
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and the degree of animosity generated between America and 
Spain was not to be felt again until 1898 when war was 
officially declared between the two nations. 
The compromise was primarily a result of the deli-
cate balance which existed between each side of the argument. 
The seriousness with which both parties viewed the situation, 
the obstacles created by a volunteer defense force in Cuba, 
and the provocations of Dan Sickles were enough to prevent 
a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Furthermore, Spain was 
a proud nation, particularly so because it was anxious to 
prove the ability of its new Republican government. It was 
· hesitant, therefore, to admit its failure to police its own 
territory. Nonetheless, the efforts of Hamilton Fish, Spanish 
President Castelar, and Polo D' Bernabe ,vere able to offset the 
difficulties. Neither government wished to provoke a more 
serious confrontation because neither had a satisfactory basis 
upon which to conduct it. They did not have adequate physical, 
legal, or theoretical support for their positions. 
Subsequently, the crisis was averted. It did not end 
suddenly. Rather, in the course of several years, the terms 
of the original protocol were complied with. Initially, a 
failure to transmit a proper account of the events was re~ 
sponsible for delay on both sides. Ultimately, it was the 
failure.of both nations to admit the errors of their argu-
ments, which postponed a final settlement. Those concerned 
were not so naive to ignore entirely the inappropriateness 
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of their positions and, as a result, they did not force 
their claims to a conclusion. A diplomatic stalemate ensued 
and, shortly thereafter, emotions subsided_, thereby guar-
anteeing a peaceful solution to the affair. Unfortunately, 
I 
the circumstances wl1ich surrounded the Virginius case were 
:not to be the same later in the century, and the diplomatic 
forces which prevented.an armed corifrontation between Spain 
.and America during the Ten Years War were unable to act 
identically twenty-five years after. 
'7''r; f-y 
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